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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study evaluates the benefits of a Digital Single Market for Europe, and quanti f ies  the 
Commission’s Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy (2015) from an economic perspective. The 
DSM Strategy seeks to tackle a wide range of issues related to the digitisation of European society, 
but an over-arching theme is the facilitation of cross-border electronic commerce within the EU. It is 
broadly in line with long-standing European Parliament initiatives to achieve a “… digital single 
market that is essentially about removing national barriers to transactions that take place online.”1 
We consider first the effects of the legislative measures that comprise the DSM Strategy, and then 
discuss their relationship to the overall EU objectives of completion of the Single Market and of the 
digitisation of European society. 
Benefits of specific DSM Strategy initiatives 
It is much too soon to measure the actual economic benefits of the DSM Strategy ex post; however, i t 
is possible to summarise the results that the Commission anticipated. We have identified some € 177 
billion in potential annual economic gains (in current euro) from full implementation of the 
legislative measures enacted or expected to be enacted, corresponding to 1.2% of current (2017) 
GDP, based on Commission estimates. 
Most of these anticipated annual gains can be attributed to the European Electronic Communications 
Code (the EECC) (€ 81 billion), amendments to the Directive on re-use of public sector information 
(PSI) (€ 45 billion), the Single Digital Gateway (assuming it is well implemented and well used) 
(€ 20 billion), and the Geo-Blocking Regulation (€ 10 billion). The large benefits attributed to the EECC 
reflect various spill-overs into the overall digitisation of European society, enabled by measures that 
promote the deployment of fibre-based fixed broadband and of 5G mobile services. Rough estimates 
of the annual benefits achievable thanks to each legislative measure (in billions of current euro once 
the measures have taken full effect, and subject to a range of limitations) are summarised in Figure 1 
and Table 1. 
The estimates are, however, highly uncertain for many different reasons. They are largely based on 
Commission Impact Assessments and other publicly available documents, but the Impact 
Assessments are quite mixed in the information and in the quality of analysis that they provide. We 
have made adjustments where we identified problems, but our figures necessarily reflect the 
assumptions and any errors in the Commission estimates. Furthermore, it is much too early to check 
these forecast gains against actual gains. There is also uncertainty as to the counterfactuals – in the 
absence of a DSM Strategy at EU level, what initiatives would the Member States have undertaken to 
promote the digitisation of society at Member State level, and to ameliorate barriers to cross-border 
e-commerce? Even where Commission Impact Assessment documents provide seemingly sensible
estimates, the results are not cross-comparable across different Impact Assessments.
Further limitations are noted in Chapter 1 of the text. 
1 European Parliament (2018a). 
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Figure 1. Annual benefits achievable based on measures already finished or in progress 
(in billions of current euro once the measures have taken full effect) 
Source: Bruegel based primarily on European Commission Impact Assessment reports 
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Table 1.  Estimated annual benefits of selected legal instruments adopted or proposed 
during the 8th Legislature (2014-2019) (billions of 2018 euro) when fully 
implemented. 
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E-commerce, content and online platforms    14.6  36.4 
Regulation addressing unjustified geo-blocking (2018)   10.3  31.4 
Council Regulation and Directive VAT for e-Commerce (2018)   2.3 - 
Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services (2018)    1.0    5.0  
Directive Audio-Visual and Media Services (2018) 1.0 - 
Data and AI 51.6 - 
Directive on the re-use of public sector information (recast) P2018 45.0 - 
Regulation on Free flow of non-personal data (2018) 4.3 - 
General Data Protection Regulation (2016) 2.3 - 
Trust and security 4.0 - 
Directive on Network Information Security (2016) 4.0 - 
E-Government 20.0 - 
Regulation establishing a Single Digital Gateway (2018) 20.0 - 
Consumer protection 0.3 5.9 
Directive on contracts for the supply of digital content - P2015 0.3 5.9 
Electronic communications networks and services   86.1  41.0 
Directive on European Electronic Communications Code (2018)    81.1 41.0 
Regulation Open Internet/TSM (2015)   5.0 - 
Total: 176.6 83.7 
S
Source:  Bruegel estimates based on European Commission Impact Assessment reports and other sources identified in the text.  
We have also identified an additional € 83.7 billion in annual gains that might be realised by fil l ing in 
current gaps in the DSM Strategy (as shown in Table 1); however, most of these involve complex and 
challenging policy interventions that would extend beyond the digital sector. 
Long-term benefits from the digitisation of the EU (based on artificial intelligence, big data, machine 
learning, the Internet of Things and more) may be much greater. This study presents a few current 
estimates of the magnitude of these gains, but does not attempt a detailed quantification of EU gains. 
The degree to which measures are needed at EU level, Member State level, or not needed at all in 
order to realise these gains is in most cases not yet clear. 
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The DSM Strategy and the benefits of fully achieving a Digital Single Market 
The DSM Strategy seeks to strengthen the EU in many ways, all of which relate to the fostering of a 
Digital Single Market; however, it cannot be said to fully achieve all of the potential benefits of a 
Digital Single Market. It provides many important steps along the way, but more work remains. 
Most but not all of the benefits of the DSM Strategy flow either from: (1) furthering the Single Market 
in the digital domain, or (2) further promotion of the digitisation of the EU. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between these two, and how they relate to the distribution of benefits. 
In a true Digital Single Market, the electronic ordering of both physical and virtual goods and services 
would be as easy and cost-effective cross-border as domestically. Many e-government services 
including health services and the establishment of a business would likewise be as easy and cost-
effective cross-border as domestically. The resulting Single Market gains could be expected to result 
in lower prices, greater choice and enhanced convenience for consumers, scale economies, and 
enhanced competitiveness of the EU in comparison with its global trading partners. 
A true Digital Single Market would make far greater use of digital technology than is the case in the 
EU today. Fast broadband, mobile (5G) services, artificial intelligence, robotics, big data, machine 
learning, the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud computing and possibly blockchain are likely to play 
transformative roles in the EU’s economy and society. The comprehensive digitisation of the EU is 
expected to result in productivity gains, reduced transaction costs, product, service and process 
innovation, and enhanced EU competitiveness in comparison to the EU’s global trading partners. 
In sum, the benefits of the legislation proposed under the DSM Strategy flow from two distinct 
dimensions: Single Market gains and digitisation gains; however, the overlap of benefits is not 
complete in any dimension, as is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. How the benefits of the Digital Single Market Strategy relate to underlying 
drivers. 
Digital Single Market Strategy Benefits
Digitisation in the EU
Fixed broadband, 5G,
Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics,
machine learning, big data,
Internet of Things (IoT),
blockchain …
Single Market Benefits
Cross-border e-commerce,
Cross-border e-government, …
Lower prices,
greater consumer choice,
scale economies,
global competitiveness
Productivity gains,
reduced transaction costs,
product, service and process innovation,
global competitiveness
Source: Bruegel 
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Overall benefits of the Single Market for offline and online commerce 
Numerous estimates have been made of the overall gains generated by the Single Market, using a 
range of methodologies and assumptions, and arriving at a range of conclusions. 
Based on an extensive literature review, Dahlberg (2015) found that the “single market has been a 
significant enabler for economic growth in Europe. … [C]omparisons are not easily done, but 2-4 per 
cent seems to be in the ballpark. … This effect primarily seems to have run through the free 
movement of goods and capital – the intra-EU trade and investment flows have experienced 
significant increases since the implementation of the single market.” 
The same study suggests that Single Market gains arising from the free movement of services have 
been limited and uneven. Indeed, there are some indications that price mark-ups in the services 
sector have actually increased. Given that services represent some 70% of European GDP and 
employment, this is worrisome. 
Duch-Brown and Martens (2016) found that if it were as easy to make business-to-consumer (B2C) 
purchases of goods cross-border as it is domestically, price convergence would lead to prices that are  
lower by 1.0% for goods purchased online and 0.5% for goods purchased offline. Consumer and 
producer surpluses would each increase by more than 1%. 
Beyond these findings, numerous studies show that broadband deployment and adoption make a 
positive contribution to societal welfare. This explains the large gains that the Commission IA 
attributes to the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC). 
Overall benefits of the digitisation of the EU 
The DSM Strategy has recognised the need “to exploit innovations such as Cloud computing, Big Data 
tools or the Internet of Things”. Concretely, much has been done to promote the deployment of fast 
fixed broadband and of mobile services based on 5G, primarily in the EECC. 
The transformation of the EU through digitisation appears to depend on the adoption of a range of 
technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, big data, machine learning, the Internet of Things 
and possibly blockchain. Different analysts provide different estimates, but most of their estimates for 
future global benefits are in the trillions of euro per year. The EU potentially stands on the threshold 
of a truly transformative change. 
In most of these areas, the European Commission has prepared strategy papers, funded research and 
studies, and in some cases created public private partnerships (PPPs) or observatories. Few of the 
current DSM Strategy legislative proposals touch on these technologies. The degree to which 
legislation is needed to deal with issues in any of these technologies is likely to become clearer during 
the next legislative term. This study identifies areas that are likely to require attention. 
Limitations of our assessment 
As noted, it is much too early for ex-post evaluations. Some of the measures have not even been 
adopted yet. Even for measures that have taken effect, it is too soon to judge effects empirically. 
We have consequently relied on ex-ante estimates, primarily derived from the European Commission 
Impact Assessments that accompany legislative proposals. These reports often neglect to provide a 
quantitative estimate of benefits or costs, and even where they do, there is little consistency in the 
estimates made. Process improvements should be considered in the Better Regulation process that 
drives these Impact Assessments. 
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Possible initiatives to realise more of the Digital Single Market’s potential 
We see opportunities for a number of further interventions in the coming legislative term. They fall  in 
three categories: (1) re-thinking the overall approach to the Digital Single Market going forward, 
(2) rounding out and completing the measures enacted during the current legislative term, and
(3) launching new initiatives to foster the digitisation of European business, government and society.
As far as a re-thinking of the approach, we offer the following reflections:
• For Single Market issues, a holistic view that integrates digital and pre-digital aspects may be in
order; however, promoting the adoption and innovation based on digital technology continues to
require a special focus of its own.
• The ultimate goal is the achievement of a dynamic EU economy that delivers a high standard of
living to all, and that provides attractive prices and choices to consumers. The Single Market, the
competitiveness of the EU, and the productivity gains achieved by digitisation are a means to
achieving this end.
• Despite the growing difficulty in distinguishing between products and services, more focus on
Single Market gains relating to services is needed during the next legislative term.
• A more integrated view across the EU’s full range of policy tools is needed, including industrial,
regulatory, competition, and trade policy. However, we cannot compromise the independence, the
integrity and the credibility of regulatory and competition policy.
Beyond this, we have identified candidate legislative measures to deal with the “unfinished business” 
from the current legislative term, and to promote the digitisation of the EU using technologies such 
as Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, big data, the collaborative economy, and cloud services. 
These measures differ from one another in many dimensions – not only in the magnitude of costs and 
benefits, but also in the degree to which the Union has competence to act. Some appear to us to be 
more politically fraught than others. 
In a few cases, we have identified complex issues where solutions probably cannot even be put 
forward until the problem has been studied in greater depth. In others, the problem is well 
understood but potential solutions would require careful assessment through the Better Regulation 
process. 
With this in mind, we have categorised the various initiatives put forward in this chapter along each 
of these dimensions in Table 2, and have clustered them into groups. The assessments reflect our 
subjective view of the benefits, costs, and difficulty of each of the candidate policy measure along 
each of the relevant dimensions. 
To summarise, the measures that we have put forward in this chapter and assessed in Table 2 are: 
• Public funding for AI and robotics. More public investment is needed in these potentially
transformative technologies, and especially in AI and robotics, in order to maintain EU
competitiveness.
• Private funding for start-ups and scale-ups. The Capital Markets Union (CMU), which included 
some measures in this direction, is stalled. EU start-ups and scale-ups continue to suffer from a lack
of venture capital, challenges in conducting IPOs, and problematic and inconsistent insolvency
regimes. A re-doubling of efforts is in order.
• Corporate taxation. Online platforms need to pay their fair share of taxes, and there is general
agreement (in line with the OECD’s BEPS process) that taxation should occur where the service is
used. Beyond that broad assertion, however, it will be hard to find consensus between the EU and 
our trading partners, and for that matter among the Member States of the EU itself.
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• Training. Training and retaining skilled IT professionals in the EU is increasingly difficult. The limited 
EU competence in this area poses a challenge.
• Employment and social protection. The combined impact of AI, machine learning, and big data
on employment is potentially substantial. This implies significant societal dislocations that will need 
to be addressed. Furthermore, there are implications for social protection of workers (including self-
employed workers) as digitisation contributes to increasing labour flexibility – a trend with both
positive and negative implications. Again, the limited EU competence in this area poses a challenge.
• E-government. Progress has been slow in the area of e-government. It is time to reinvigorate EU
efforts on cross-border e-government service.
• Network and information security. Progress has been made in the current legislative term when it
comes to strengthening the role of ENISA, and establishing a certification programme at EU level.
Nonetheless, the level of investment at EU level is ludicrously small in comparison to the rate at
which threats are growing, not only from commercial hackers but also from states and from state
sponsored hackers. A more muscular approach to cybersecurity at EU level appears to be needed.
• Cross-border sales of goods that require delivery. This would be a necessary prerequisite to
expanding the Geo-Blocking Regulation to include goods that require cross-border delivery. For this
to be workable, it would be necessary to first address non-harmonised requirements related to
product safety, labelling and more. Existing legislation that mandates mutual recognition of goods
sold in another Member State would need to be made fully effective in practice. 
• Re-think the structure of the EU audio-visual sector. This would be a necessary prerequisite to
expanding the Geo-Blocking Regulation to include services that primarily deliver copyrighted
audiovisual content. Expanding the Geo-Blocking Regulation without first addressing structural
problems in the audiovisual sector would risk undermining the funding model for the production of 
audiovisual content.
• Expand the scope of consumer protection. Inclusion of commercial guarantees, consumer credit
and gambling could generate welfare gains. Further extension could be considered to fully cover
financial services, passenger travel, healthcare and real estate.
• Further improve access regulation. Further work is likely to be needed to fully realise the
broadband investment that the EECC sought.
• Lower cross-border parcel delivery NPO prices. The Regulation as enacted does little to bring 
prices down to levels reflective of costs. Expanding the Regulation to mandate more competitive
pricing, mainly on the part of National Postal Operators, would generate net gains, and would
encourage a second round of enhancements.
• Liability and new technologies. New legislation is likely to be needed to address issues of product
and service liability where AI and machine learning come into play.
• Fake news and inappropriate content. Issues with inappropriate or misleading content are
growing. A more muscular and comprehensive policy approach is likely to eventually be needed
than the voluntary programmes currently in place to deal with “fake news”. Automated tools based 
on AI, machine learning and big data techniques show promise in detecting inappropriate content,
and “fake news”.
• Detecting collusion. Automated platforms may have a tendency to collude, with or without
malicious intent, but automated tools may also prove crucial in detecting collusion.
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Table 2. A comparative perspective on possible initiatives to realise more of the potential of the Digital Single Market. 
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Action needed 
High payback areas where prompt action is feasible 
Public funding for AI and robotics H L Y M L Y Further increase funding 
Private funding for start-ups and scale-ups (CMU) H M Y H H N Political resolution needed 
Corporate taxation M L Y H H N Political resolution needed 
High payback areas where more study is needed to formulate plans 
Training and re-training H M N M H Y Study and funding needed 
Employment and social protection H H Y H H Y Many needs are understood 
E-government M H Y M H Y Study barriers, then push ahead 
Network and information security H H N M H Y More EU activism needed 
High payback areas where the way forward is not clear 
Cross-border  sales of goods that require delivery H H N H H N Study, better mutual recognition 
Re-think the structure of the EU audio-visual sector H H N H H N Comprehensive study 
Medium payback areas where more study is needed to formulate plans 
Expand scope of consumer protection M M N M M N Study of promising sectors 
Further improve access regulation M M N M M N Study 
Lower cross-border parcel delivery NPO prices M L Y H H Y Political resolution needed 
Areas where both study and research are needed 
Liability and new technologies L L N M M N Study 
Fake news and inappropriate content H* H N M M N Study  and technical progress 
Identifying collusion M M N L L Y Study and technical progress 
H=high, M=medium, L=low, Y=yes, N=no 
* The societal gains are not mainly economic.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Numerous legislative measures have been initiated or enacted in support of the Commission’s Digital 
Single Market Strategy (European Commission, 2015a). This report provides a stock-taking of what has 
been achieved in economic terms, of what remains to be done, and of opportunities for the coming 
legislative term. 
The study (IP/A/IMCO/IC/2018-012) has been undertaken for Policy Department A of the European 
Parliament, on behalf of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO). Preliminary 
results were presented at the IMCO Workshop on 10 July 2018. 
1.1. Objectives 
The study “Contribution of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection to Growth” (hereinafter 
Alleweldt at al. (2014)) was prepared for the IMCO Committee in 2014. That study called for an 
ambitious revision of European policy objectives in order to more fully realise the potential of the 
Internal Market as a growth engine and an anti-crisis mechanism. The current European Commission 
followed this path by means of a new set of strategies, including the DSM Strategy for Europe 2 and A 
Single Market Strategy.3 
The IMCO Committee has requested a workshop and an update of the 2014 study. The update is 
comprised of a series of in-depth analyses. This study, which focuses on the Digital Single Market, is 
one component of that series.  
The aims of the current update are (1) to provide background information and advice for the 
Members of the IMCO Committee on benefits brought in the past and to be realised in the 
foreseeable future for EU businesses and citizens by legislation established in the field of Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection, and (2) to reflect on priority measures and actions that could be 
undertaken in this field going forward. 
1.2. Background 
The Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy was intended to tackle a wide range of issues related to the 
digitisation of European society. A key over-arching theme is the facilitation of cross-border electronic 
commerce within the EU. The DSM sought to do this with a barrage of legislative measures, each 
aimed at addressing one or more of the barriers to cross-border e-commerce that have been 
identified by e-merchants or consumers (and evidenced in surveys). 
The DSM Strategy is broadly in line with numerous initiatives undertaken by the Parliament 
over the years. For the Parliament, the “… Digital Single Market is essentially about removing 
national barriers to transactions that take place online. It builds on the concept of the 
common market, intended to eliminate trade barriers between Member States with the aim of 
increasing economic prosperi ty … 
2  European Commission (2015a), Digital Single Market Strategy, COM(2015) 192 final. 
3  European Commission (2015d), Single Market Strategy, COM(2015) 550 final. 
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Market and government services developed within the Digital Single Market are evolving from fixed to 
mobile platforms and becoming increasingly ubiquitous, offering access to information and content 
anytime and on any device (ubiquitous commerce and ubiquitous government).These advances call 
for a regulatory framework that is conducive to the development of cloud computing, 
borderless mobile data connectivity and simplified access to information and content, while 
safeguarding privacy, personal data, cybersecurity and net neutrality.”4 
Pursuant to the DSM Strategy, the Commission has introduced dozens of legislative measures, 
some of which have been enacted, some of which have been politically agreed by the co-
legislators but not yet finalised, and some of which are still in the pipeline (see Section 4.1). 
For each measure, it will be important at some point in time to reflect (consistent with 
Better Regulation principles) on the degree to which it achieves its goals. Was the measure as 
proposed effective, efficient and coherent in addressing the problem identified? Is that still the 
case for the measure as enacted? Will transposition (where needed) and implementation at 
Member State level be effective and efficient? 
For the most part, it is too early for that. Few measures are yet in force. 
1.3. Methodology 
This study seeks to quantify the economic benefits of the Digital Single Market Strategy. The 
DSM Strategy seeks to move Europe in the direction of the achievement of a Digital Single 
Market, but i t i s not synonymous with it. In its DSM Strategy, the Commission defines a Digital 
Single Market as “one in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured and where individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online 
activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal 
data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence.” (European Commission, 
2015a) 
Our task here is to quantify the benefits of the DSM Strategy based on existing data. This differs from 
the potential benefits of full achievement of a Digital Single Market, first because the Strategy 
does not take us all the way to a Digital Single Market, and second because the legislative 
measures generate a range of benefits, not all of which should necessarily be viewed as Single 
Market benefits. 
The DSM Strategy seeks to strengthen the EU in many ways, all of which relate to the fostering of a 
Digital Single Market; however, it cannot be said to fully achieve all of the potential benefits 
of a Digital Single Market. It provides many important steps along the way, but more work 
remains. 
The gains from DSM Strategy legislative measures can be assumed to derive from a number of 
large -scale effects, including: 
• Elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, especially e-commerce, which enhances
the efficiency of the Single Market for goods and for services.
o Resultant reduction in prices paid (i.e. reduced mark-ups).
o Increased variety of products and services available to consumers.
o Increased competitiveness.
• Increased consumer willingness to use online services due to increased trust.
4 European Parliament (2018a). See also European Parliament (2018b) and van Veenstra et al. (2013).
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• Improved efficiency thanks to digitisation
More generally, most but not all of the benefits of the DSM Strategy flow either from (1) furthering 
the Single Market in the digital domain, or from (2) further promotion of the digitisation of the EU. 
Figure 3 shows the relationship among these two, and how they relate to the distribution of benefits. 
In a true Digital Single Market, the electronic ordering of both physical and online goods and services 
would be as easy and as cost-effective cross-border as domestically. Many e-government services 
including health services and the establishment of a business would likewise be as easy and as cost-
effective cross-border as domestically. The resultant Single Market gains could be expected to result 
in lower prices, greater choice and enhanced convenience for consumers, scale economies, and 
enhanced competitiveness of the EU in comparison with our global trading partners. 
A true Digital Single Market would make far greater use of digital technology than is the case in the 
EU today. Fast broadband, mobile (5G) services, artificial intelligence, big data, machine learning, the 
Internet of Things (IoT), and possibly blockchain are likely to play a transformative role in the EU’s 
economy and society. The comprehensive digitisation of the EU could be expected to result in 
productivity gains; in reduced transaction costs; in product, service and process innovation; and again 
in enhanced competitiveness of the EU in comparison with our global trading partners. 
These benefits intersect with those of the Digital Single Market Strategy, but the overlap is not 
complete in any dimension, as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  How the benefits of the Digital Single Market Strategy relate to underlying drivers. 
Digital Single Market Strategy Benefits
Digitisation in the EU
Fixed broadband, 5G,
Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics,
machine learning, big data,
Internet of Things (IoT),
blockchain …
Single Market Benefits
Cross-border e-commerce,
Cross-border e-government, …
Lower prices,
greater consumer choice,
scale economies,
global competitiveness
Productivity gains,
reduced transaction costs,
product, service and process innovation,
global competitiveness
Source: Bruegel 
Our terms of reference call on us to review existing data (including ex ante impact assessments, ex 
post evaluations, and publicly available studies) in order to: 
• critically assess the benefits of the Digital Single Market (DSM) Strategy in the context of other
policies, taking into account both e-commerce and e-government;
• assess the extent to which previously anticipated achievements in the area of the DSM have
materialised and have contributed to the achievement of EU objectives;
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• explore the potential contribution of current initiatives in the foreseeable future; and
• formulate a list of gaps where further improvement of policy-making on European level is
possible.
The source documents are subject to numerous limitations, as further elaborated in Section 1.5. Few 
of the ex ante impact assessments contain rigorous estimates of benefits, and those that do are by no 
means cross-comparable. They tend to provide optimistic estimates of what might possibly be 
achieved if all proposed measures were adopted, in conjunction with other measures (that are not 
necessarily identified). At best, they reflect the legislation that was proposed, not the legislation that 
was ultimately adopted. 
Furthermore, it is much too early for ex post evaluations. Some of the measures have not even been 
adopted yet. For most of those measures that have taken effect, it is too soon to judge effects 
empirically. 
For these reasons and more (refer again to Section 1.5), simply adding up the benefits estimated in 
each of the previous ex ante Impact Assessments needs to be done with care in order to avoid biased 
results. With that in mind, we have introduced several control mechanisms. 
First, in order to inject some realism into the process, we have critically assessed each of the Impact 
Assessment estimates of economic benefits. 
Second, we have attempted to correct for possible double-counting during the initial analysis. 
Finally, we have reviewed any publicly available studies of the overall economic benefits of the Single  
Market, beginning with Cecchini (1988),5 and including the comprehensive survey in Dahlberg 
(2015).6 With this done, we compared top-down estimates of overall benefits with bottom-up 
estimates of the gains from individual legislative measures. If the bottom-up sum had exceeded the 
top-down estimates of overall benefits, we would have assumed that double-counting had taken 
place. As it happens, the bottom-up summation appears to be reasonable based on the top-down 
check. 
5 Cecchini, P., Catinat, M. and Jacquemin, A. (1988), Europe 1992: The Overall Challenge [summary of the Cecchini report]. SEC (8 8 ) 5 2 4 
final, European Commission. 
6 Dahlberg, E. (2015), Economic Effects of the European Single Market: Review of the empirical literature. National Board of Trade of 
Sweden.
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Figure 4. Methodology followed for this study. 
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1.4. Relation to other studies 
As previously noted, this study represents an updated reflection on the 2014 study “Contribution of 
the Internal Market and Consumer Protection to Growth”. (Alleweldt et al., 2014) 
The Parliament’s Policy Department A launched a number of small studies in parallel with this one in 
order to update the 2014 results. This study is closely linked to a study of the legal aspects of 
measures attempted or taken as part of the DSM,7 conducted by Prof Alexandre de Streel and his 
colleagues at the University of Namur. 
Meanwhile, several other studies are ongoing, each covering legal or economic aspects of a different 
element of the legislation relevant to IMCO that was attempted or enacted over the current team. 
1.5. Limitations 
We would like to acknowledge at the outset a number of limitations as to what it was feasible for us 
to do. Some of these reflect limitations in available data, others reflect limited time and resources for 
the analysis. 
The terms of reference call on us to summarise what is known about economic benefits of the DSM, 
largely based on Commission Impact Assessments and other publicly available research. The Impact 
Assessments, however, are quite mixed in the information that they provide. Some estimate benefits, 
but not costs. A few estimate costs, but not benefits. Some make no attempt to estimate either. 
7  In-depth analysis on “Benefits of European Digital Single Market”, IP/A/IMCO/IC/2018-014. 
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Our figures are based in most cases on Commission estimates as reported in Impact Assessment 
reports where available. We have made adjustments where we identified problems; however, since 
we have not gone back to primary data to do our own econometric assessments, our figures 
necessarily reflect the assumptions and any errors in the Commission estimates. 
Another cause of uncertainty relates to the counter-factuals. In the absence of a DSM Strategy at EU 
level, would things truly have followed a “business as usual” course? What initiatives would the 
Member States have undertaken to promote the digitisation of society at Member State level? What 
would they have done bilaterally or multi-laterally to ameliorate barriers to cross-border e-
commerce? 
Even where Commission Impact Assessment documents provide seemingly sensible estimates, the 
assumptions are not consistent across different Impact Assessment documents for different 
legislative instruments – the results are not cross comparable. The source Impact Assessment 
documents were each constructed individually, with no assurance that they collectively provide a 
coherent picture. In many cases, the Impact Assessment documents are identifying legitimate gains 
for which the corresponding legislative measures are perhaps a necessary condition, but by no means 
a sufficient condition. Our sense is that many of the Impact Assessments are in effect describing the 
benefits of a fully digitalised, fully integrated Single Market for digital services (the full-fledged Digital 
Single Market), which is to say that some of the Impact Assessments are measuring substantially the 
same benefits. This potentially leads to double counting or multiply counting the same benefits. 
In order to correct somewhat for this, we have checked each estimate for reasonableness, have 
avoided double-counting wherever we identified a risk, and as a final cross-check have compared the 
individual Impact Assessment estimates with overall estimates of the gains from the DSM in order to 
be able to back out any inappropriate estimates. 
Finally, we note that the Parliament has launched multiple studies in the same series of in-depth 
analyses, all of which were conducted in parallel. We have extensively harmonised this economic 
analysis of the DSM with the legal analysis of the DSM that Prof de Streel and his colleagues are 
conducting (project IP/A/IMCO/IC/2018-012);8 however, it was not practical to fully harmonise this 
study with all of the other parallel economic studies. For that reason, it seems likely that there wi l l be 
some double-counting of benefits across the studies. 
1.6. Implications for the evolution of the Better Regulation process 
The challenges identified in Section 1.5 make clear that there is room for improvement in the overall 
Better Regulation process. 
On the positive side, it is worth noting that we did not identify any gaps in the coverage of legislative 
proposals by Impact Assessment reports. 
8  In-depth analysis on “Benefits of European Digital Single Market”. 
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On the minus side, it is striking to note the number of Impact Assessment reports that made no 
attempt to quantify overall benefits. Likewise, few of the Impact Assessment reports sought to 
quantify administrative costs, transaction costs, or any other costs.9 
It is probably unrealistic to hope for a full harmonisation of the estimation of costs and benefits across 
all Impact Assessment reports, but there is probably more that can be done to ensure that estimates 
are made when feasible, and that the assumptions used are somewhat consistent (at least within 
families of inter-related measures). For example, a worksheet could be included by default in the 
Impact Assessment report that either provides estimates of a standardised set of costs and benefits 
for the Preferred Option, or else a brief explanation as to why an estimate is impractical. As for 
methodology, more could be done to ensure consistency in estimation. 
Where a group of inter-related legislative measures collectively seeks to achieve some objective (as 
has been the case with the DSM Strategy), it might be most appropriate to provide a combined 
economic assessment rather than to analyse the measures one by one. The Better Regulation 
Guidelines (2017) provide for fitness checks that constitute a collective ex post “evaluation of a group 
of interventions which have some relationship with each other (normally a common set of 
objectives), justifying a joint analysis”; however, there does not appear to be any equivalent ex ante 
mechanism at the time when forward strategic planning is initiated (and thus in advance of the 
Impact Assessment). 
This suggestion is very much in line with Muller et al. (2015), which proposes enhancements to the 
Better Regulation process so as to create an “enhanced performance-based policy cycle which 
includes the strategic programming phase of policy development”. 
1.7. Structure of this report 
Chapter 2 focuses on the two main pillars of the Digital Single Market: the facilitation of cross-border 
e-commerce, and the digitisation of EU society. The chapter provides an overview of e-commerce in
general, and of cross-border e-commerce in particular, since this was an over-arching theme for most
of the DSM legislative proposals. It also provides an overview of the magnitude of economic benefi ts
potentially available with key technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, machine learning,
big data, and enhanced fixed broadband and mobile (5G) services. Chapter 3 concerns itself with
estimates of benefits of achievement of the single market for goods and services overall, while
Chapter 4 deals with estimated or measured benefits associated with the specific legislative measures
put forward during the current legislative term. Chapter 5 concerns itself with the need to re-think
the overall approach to the Digital Single Market going forward, the unfinished DSM business of the
current legislative term, and the opportunities to launch new forward-looking initiatives in the
coming legislative term. 
9 Muller et al. (2015) likewise identified a lack of quantitative substantiation in numerous Impact Assessment reports. Per the Better 
Regulation Guidelines (2017), “All relevant impacts should be assessed qualitatively and quantitatively whenever possible.” 
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2. THE DSM STRATEGY AND DIGITISATION OF EUROPE
In this chapter, we provide context for the Digital Single Market Strategy, and more broadly for the 
Digital Single Market aspirations that have been visible in the Parliament as well over many years (see 
Section 1.2). 
As conceived in 2015, and in line with Parliament’s desire to “to boost the economy through 
e-commerce, while at the same time facilitating administrative and financial compliance for
businesses and empowering customers through e-government.” (European Parliament, 2018a), the
DSM Strategy sought primarily to ameliorate barriers to cross-border e-commerce. At the same time,
it sought to strengthen emerging digital services (as we discuss in Section 2.1), including in particular
the deployment of fixed and wireless broadband internet access services. The evolution of these new
services has moved on (as we explain in Section 2.2), raising new issues that in turn provide
opportunities for further public policy interventions during the coming legislative term.
KEY FINDINGS 
• Many of the DSM Strategy legislative initiatives have to do, in way or another, with the
promotion of cross-border e-commerce. Others generate benefits by furthering
the digitisation of the EU.
• E-commerce revenues in the EU are growing at some 14% per year; however, cross-
border sales lag substantially behind domestic, suggesting a substantial opportunity to do 
better.
• The measures in the DSM appropriately target the areas where e-commerce merchants
or consumers have identified challenges in purchasing cross-border, based on survey results.
• The transformation of the EU through digitisation appears to depend on the adoption of a
range of technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, big data, machine learning, the
Internet of Things, and possibly blockchain.
• Different analysts provide different estimates, but most of their estimates of potential
global future collective benefits from these technologies are in trillions of euro per year.
• The Commission has been active in promoting these technologies, but the DSM Strategy
provides few legislative measures that specifically address them. The activities in the
next legislative term as regards the promotion of digitisation are likely to focus on needs 
that were not yet obvious in 2015, many of which are not entirely clear today. 
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2.1. The DSM strategy and cross-border e-commerce 
Most of the relevant DSM legislative initiatives have to do, in way or another, with the promotion of 
cross-border e-commerce. The EU is doing well in terms of the use of e-commerce, even though the 
EU is not a major provider of e-commerce platforms. Even so, cross-border sales lag substantially 
behind domestic, suggesting a substantial opportunity to do better. 
European e-commerce is growing at a healthy 14% per annum, and represents nearly 3% of GDP (see 
Figure 5).10 Expressed differently, e-commerce represented 8.1% of total 2016 retail sales in the EU-
28.11 
Figure 5. Overall e-commerce revenues in Europe. 
Source: Bruegel based on Ecommerce Europe.12 
In 2017, 20% of EU-28 enterprises reported that they sold online to customers in their own country, 
but only 9% sold online to customers in other EU countries.13 In 2017, 87% made domestic e-
commerce purchases, but only 33% from other Member States.14 
Producers identify a range of problems, as depicted in Figure 6. 
10  E-commerce Europe. 
11  E-commerce Europe. 
12  Note that this reflects a broad definition of Europe, including for instance Russia and Turkey. 
13   Eurostat, at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/E-commerce_statistics viewed 5 October 2018.
14  Eurostat, at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/E-commerce_statistics_for_individuals#undefined viewed 5 
October 2018. 
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Figure 6. Difficulties experienced when selling to other EU countries (percent of 
enterprises with web sales to other EU countries, EU-28, 2016). 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
High cost of delivering or returning
products
Lack of knowledge of foreign
languages
Related to resolving complaints and
disputes
Adapting product labelling
Restrictions from business partners
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat data. 
Consumers identify a slight different range of problems. 
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Figure 7. Reasons for not purchasing a product online from abroad (2014-15). 
Source:  Bruegel based on the ‘Consumer Barometer’ survey conducted on behalf of Google, at www.consumerbarometer.com, viewed 
21 February 2017. The question asked was: “Why have you never purchased a product online from abroad?” 15 
The DSM sought to deal with many of the problems as perceived by merchants and consumers, 
notably including: 
• Lower cross-border parcel delivery prices.
• Simplified and more coherent VAT procedures.
• Better coverage of consumer protection, but with less “gold plating”.
• Prevention of unjustified geo-blocking (where feasible).
• Better protection of consumer privacy.
This is broadly in line with Parliament interests over a period of many years (European Parliament, 
2018a), and is also in line with the recommendations of Godel et al. (2017). 
A full list of measures attempted or enacted appears in Chapter 4, together with a discussion of the 
degree to which we anticipate that they will generate economic benefits. 
15  J. Scott Marcus, John Morales and Georgios Petropoulos (2017), “Strengthening cross-border e-commerce in the European Uni on” , in 
Remaking Europe: The New Manufacturing as an Engine for Growth, ed. Reinhilde Veugelers, Bruegel, at 
http://bruegel.org/2017/09/remaking-europe/. 
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2.2. The continuing evolution of the digitisation of European society 
The transformation of the EU through digitisation appears to depend on the adoption of a range of 
technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, big data, machine learning, the Internet of 
Things, 5G, possibly blockchain, and more. The DSM Strategy recognised the need “to exploit 
innovations such as Cloud computing, Big Data tools or the Internet of Things”,16 but the 2015 
document provides few concrete measures to support these emerging technologies. Instead, the 
DSM Strategy focuses on the problems that were perceived as urgent and immediate in 2015: 
broadband deployment and spectrum management, media policy, competition issues posed by 
online platforms, and consumer privacy and security. These issues are still very much with us and wi l l  
surely remain so for many years, but the activities in the next legislative term as regards the 
promotion of digitisation are likely to focus on needs that were not yet obvious in 2015, many of 
which are not entirely clear today. 
The European Parliament has been actively engaged in the fostering of these technologies, and 
exploration of the policy issues that flow from them (European Parliament 2017 and 2018c). The 
Commission has also been active, most recently with European Commission (2018k). 
We list below a few of the technologies that are now hitting their stride, and the potential economic 
opportunity associated with each. Many of the estimates are drawn from McKinsey (2013), which 
provides a consistent scaling in US dollars. Different analysts provide different estimates, but all of 
these numbers are enormous. We potentially stand on the threshold of a transformative change. 
• Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning: The collective potential value of these
technologies in conjunction with the use of big data is enormous. For instance, McKinsey
(2013) estimates “that knowledge work automation tools and systems could take on tasks
that would be equal to the output of 110 million to 140 million full-time equivalents (FTEs). I t
is possible that this incremental productivity … could have as much as $5.2 trillion to $6.7
trillion in economic impact annually by 2025.”
• The data economy: IDC Italia and the Lisbon Council (2018) estimates the direct value of the
data market in the EU28 as representing € 50 billion in 2017, with the potential  to grow to €
77 billion in 2020 and € 110 billion in 2025.17 Spill-overs into the broader EU28 economy
based on the use of the data are much larger, representing € 787 billion in 2025.18 Under more 
optimistic assumptions, the direct value of the data market could be as much as € 146 bi l l ion
in 2025.19
16   Page 14. 
17  IDC Italia and the Lisbon Council (2018), page 100. This is the value of “the marketplace where digital data is exchanged as ‘products’ or  
‘services’ as a result of the elaboration of raw data” under a Baseline scenario that is characterised by “a healthy growth of data 
innovation, a moderate concentration of power by dominant data owners with a data governance model protecting personal data 
rights, and an uneven but rather wide distribution of data innovation benefits in the society”.
18   IDC Italia and the Lisbon Council (2018), page 20.
19   IDC Italia and the Lisbon Council (2018), page 100. This is under a High Growth scenario characterised by “a high level of data 
innovation, low data power concentration, an open and transparent data governance model with high data sharing, and a wide 
distribution of the benefits of data innovation in the society”.
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• Robotics: Take-up in Europe is substantial, especially in Germany. “Advanced robotics … has
the potential to affect $6.3 trillion in labor costs globally.” (McKinsey, 2013).
• The Internet of Things (IoT): In the past, most internet users were human beings. Today,
most “users” are intelligent devices. Cisco (2013) estimates that 200 million devices were
already connected to the internet in 2013, but that this number will increase to 50 bi l l ion in
2020. They estimate $14.4 trillion in the combination of increased revenues and lower costs
that is created or will migrate among companies and industries from 2013 to 2022. Per
McKinsey (2013), “The Internet of Things has the potential to create economic impact of $2.7
trillion to $6.2 trillion annually by 2025”.
• Cloud computing: The time for cloud computing is ripe thanks to widespread deployment of 
fixed and mobile broadband together with progressive Moore’s Law improvements in the
price/performance of servers. Cloud computing can offer substantial economic benefits in
comparison with local deployment of dedicated hardware and software. “Cloud technology
has the potential to improve productivity across $3 trillion in global enterprise IT spending, as
well as enabling the creation of new online products and services for billions of consumers
and millions of businesses alike.” (McKinsey, 2013)
• Collaborative economy: Vaughan and Hawksworth (2014) calculated that the collaborative
economy was contributing $15 billion annually worldwide in ten sectors20 and could reach
$335 billion by 2025. Goudin (2016) approximated the potential economic gain from better
use of resources through the collaborative economy to be €572 billion in annual
consumption across in the EU if substantial associated regulatory barriers were removed;
otherwise, those barriers could reduce the annual value of potential increased use by up to
€18 billion in the shorter term and by up to €134 billion in the medium and longer term. In a
more recent study using a new empirical methodology, Eljas-Taal et al. (2018) estimate
annual revenues of the collaborative economy in four sectors to represent 0.17% of EU GDP.
They estimate that the collaborative economy provides work for approximately 395,000
people active across the EU, representing about 0.15% of EU employment.21
• 5G wireless networks: The ability to simultaneously support multiple use cases from a single
network, including (1) high bandwidth mobile broadband services, (2) factory automation,
and (3) widespread Internet of Things deployments has substantial upside potential.
Estimates vary, but all imply large gains from mobile networks that will primarily be 5G. Per
McKinsey (2013), “mobile Internet usage could generate global economic impact of $3.7
trillion to $10.8 trillion per year by 2025”. Per IHS Markit (2017), “In 2035, 5G will enable  $12.3
trillion of global economic output. That is nearly equivalent to US consumer spending in 2016 
and more than the combined spending by consumers in China, Japan, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France in 2016.”
20   P2P finance, online staffing, P2P accommodation, car sharing, equipment rental, B&B and hostels, car rental, book rental and DVD 
rental.
21   Codagnone et al. (2016) cautions that many of these estimates are highly uncertain due to lack of reliable data, lack of empirical 
evidence, or questionable assumptions.
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The GSMA (2018) estimates that mobile will contribute $4.6 trillion to the global economy by 
2022 (5% of GDP), up from $3.6 trillion in 2017 (4.5% of GDP). Most of this value-added 
increase will be due to productivity gains. In the developed world, the adoption of M2M and 
IoT solutions will drive increased productivity. 
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3. OVERALL SINGLE MARKET BENEFITS
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter, respectively, we consider a range of current and previous 
studies that assessed either ex ante or ex post the benefits of strengthening the European Single 
Market. The assessments in these sections do not limit themselves to digital aspects. We then close 
with a review in Section 3.3 of assessments of benefits specific to the Digital Single Market. 
The EU’s Single Market is characterised by the so-called Four Freedoms: freedom of movement of 
goods, services, capital, and individuals. For this study, our primary concern is with measures to 
promote the free flow of goods and services. 
KEY FINDINGS 
Numerous estimates of the gains produced by the Single Market have been made over the years, 
using a range of methodologies and assumptions, and arriving at a range of conclusions. 
We concur with the key findings of the comprehensive literature survey provided by Dahlberg 
(2015), which was based on most of the same studies that appear in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this in-
depth analysis: 
• “The single market has been a significant enabler for economic growth in Europe. 
Comparisons are not easily done, but 2-4 per cent seems to be in the ballpark.”
• “This effect primarily seems to have run through the free movement of goods and 
capital –the intra-EU trade and investment flows have experienced significant 
increases since the implementation of the single market.”
• “The single market does not seem to have affected the flows of services and people to 
a significant extent.”
• We have not identified any definitive ex post findings on the impact of free 
movement of services.
• Single Market gains due to free movement of services appear to have been limited 
and uneven, and there are some indications that price mark-ups in the services sector 
have actually increased. Given that services represent some 70% of European 
GDP and employment, this is worrisome. 
Dahlberg’s estimate of gains of 2-4% of GDP implies that the Single Market currently generates 
between € 340 and € 680 billion per year in benefits for the EU. 
If it were as easy to purchase goods cross-border as domestically, price convergence would lead to 
prices that are lower by 1.0% for goods purchased online and 0.5% for good purchase offline. 
Consumer and producer surplus would increase by 1.2% and 1.4% each. The DSM Strategy as 
enacted to date realises only a fraction of this gain. We estimate that some € 36 billion per year in 
additional consumer gains alone remain to be realised. 
Beyond this, broadband deployment and adoption clearly contribute to societal welfare. 
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3.1. Ex ante estimates of the benefits of the Single Market 
The study “Contribution of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection to Growth” (Alleweldt at al . 
(2014)) provided a concise summary of research conducted to date on the benefits of the Single 
Market. Inasmuch as this report represents in large part an update of that study, we provide here an 
updated summary in Table 3 of research conducted, drawing on the survey of empirical work in 
Dahlberg (2015). For each of the studies, we identify the primary channel by means of which  
European GDP or other aspects of the European economy are influenced. 
As explained in Section 1.3, the Single Market, the Digital Single Market, and the DSM Strategy are 
three different things in terms of their economic benefits. In this section and also in Section 3.2, we 
are speaking only of the Single Market. We return to the Digital Single Market in Section 3.3, and to 
the legislative measures that comprise the DSM Strategy in Chapter 4. 
All of these studies seek to address the EU as a whole, but they are not directly cross-comparable. For 
example, different studies are based on different numbers of Member States. 
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Table 3. Overview of research on ex ante impacts on growth. 
Driver of impact 
measured 
Estimation of increase in 
EU GDP /  
Economic Effects Methodology Source 
Single Market 
Integration 
4.25-6.5% in GDP in the 
long run; 
Price level drops by 6 %; 
Creation of 2 million jobs 
EU-12. Partial 
equilibrium model 
Cecchini et al. (1988) 
0.5% in GDP for immediate 
static effects; 1.2-2.6% for 
dynamic long-run effects. 
General Equilibrium 
Model 
Harrison et al. (1994) 
4% in GDP Calibrated model to data 
on 10 industries 
Smith and Venables 
(1988) 
0.25-1% in annual GDP 
growth 
Calibration with 
macroeconomic growth 
model 
Baldwin (1989) 
Elimination of 
intra-EU goods 
and services 
barriers 
10% in the long run General equilibrium 
model. Estimation based 
on long-run 
steady state accounting 
for 
dynamic effects. Applies 
to goods 
and services. 
Straathof et al. 
(2008) 
14% by 2020 Based on the MIRAGE 
computable general 
equilibrium 
(CGE) model, simulations 
applied 
to scenarios covering 
2011-2020, 
accounting for dynamic 
effects. 
Aussilloux et al. 
(2011) 
Trade in services increases 
by 7.2%; FDI increases by 
3.8%; productivity 
increases by 4.7%; GDP 
increases by 0.8% 
Gravity model  Monteagudo et al. 
(2012) 
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Driver of impact 
measured 
Estimation of increase in 
EU GDP /  
Economic Effects Methodology Source 
A 50% reduction 
of 
intra-EU goods 
and 
services barriers 
An increase in the EU’s 
GDP by around 
USD 1 trillion in 2025 
(in 2007 prices), or 
equivalent to around 4.7% 
of the EU’s GDP 
Based on the MIRAGE 
computable general 
equilibrium 
(CGE), model simulations 
covering the period 
2012-2025. 
Covers EU-27. 
Decreux 
(2012) 
Overcoming 
market 
fragmentation in 
six 
economic sectors 
An increase in the EU27 
economy by 1.6% in 
the long run 
Based on an analysis of 
productivity gaps in six 
sectors (retail trade; 
business services; 
accommodation; 
logistics; wholesale 
trade; construction), 
which account for 20.2% 
of the total EU labour 
productivity gap. 
Covers EU-27. 
London 
Economics / 
PwC (2013) 
Source: Bruegel based in large part on Alleweldt (2014) and Dahlberg (2015). 
3.2. Ex post estimates of the benefits of the Single Market 
Alleweldt at al. (2014) also provided a concise summary22 of ex post analysis conducted to date on the 
benefits of the Single Market. Once again, we provide an updated summary of research conducted in 
Table 4, drawing on the survey of empirical work in Dahlberg (2015). Following the approach taken in 
Dahlberg (2015), we categorise the studies depending on which of the Four Freedoms is of primary 
interest – freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, or individuals. 
22 Table 7 on page 29. 
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Table 4. Overview of research on ex post impacts on growth. 
Driver of impact 
measured 
Estimation of increase 
in EU GDP /  
Economic Effects Methodology Source 
Single market 
integration 
About 1% over 1992- 
1994 
Aggregation of 38 
studies and one 
business survey. 
Covers EU-12 
Monti and Buchan 
(1997) 
1.8% over 1992-2002 Using Commission’s 
QUEST general 
equilibrium model. 
Covers EU-25. 
European 
Commission 
(2003) 
2.2% over 1992-2006 Using Commission’s 
QUEST general 
equilibrium model. 
Without the 2004 
enlargement, the 
impact on EU GDP 
would be below 2%. 
Covers EU-25. 
Ilzkovitz et al. 
(2007) 
4.8-5.7% since 1987 Unidentified European 
Commission 
(2010) 
2.13% over 1992-2008 Unidentified European 
Commission 
(2012) 
EU membership raises 
on average GDP 
growth per worker by 
1.4 to 1.6 percent, 
compared to non-
members. 
Fixed-effect and 
instrumental-variation 
estimations 
König (2015) 
European integration 
process 
2-3% over 1958-2005 Gravity equation 
model accounting for 
trade diversion 
effects. 
Straathof et al. 
(2008) 
5% over 1950-2008 Counterfactual 
assessment based 
on each individual 
step of European 
integration. Covers 
EU-25. 
Boltho and 
Eichengreen 
(2008) 
12% over 1973-2004 Counterfactual 
assessment based 
on enlargement 
Member States 
Campos et al. 
(2014) 
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Driver of impact 
measured 
Estimation of increase 
in EU GDP /  
Economic Effects Methodology Source 
A one-point increase 
of the EU integration 
index is associated 
with a rise in the 
growth rate of the real 
GDP per capita of 0.08 
percentage points, 
over 1992-2012 
Based on a 
counterfactual 
assessment applying a 
composite index of EU 
integration for 14 EU 
Member States 
Petersen et al. 
(2014) 
Rationalization, 
human capital, and 
the use of ICT are the 
main drivers of TFP in 
the EU. 
Long-panel analysis 
(augmented mean 
group estimator and 
dynamic OLS), 17 EU 
countries, 13 sectors 
over 1995-2007. 
Gehringer et al. (2015) 
Free movement of 
goods 
18% increase in intra-
EU trade in the 
immediate years 
following the launch 
of the single market 
Gravity model Straathof et al. (2008) 
2% increase in EU 
GDP; 38% increase in 
intra-EU trade. 
Gravity model HM Treasury (2005) 
A significant decrease 
in home bias from 
1995 to 2007 
Gravity model Cafiso (2009) and 
Pacchioli (2011) 
1.24% increase in GDP 
for smaller EU15 
members due to 
increase in import 
variety 
Structural model using 
disaggregated trade 
data from 1999 to 
2008 
Mohler and Seitz 
(2010) 
Price mark-ups fall by 
32% in the 
manufacturing sector 
Competition 
measured by Lerner 
index 
Badinger (2007) 
Increase in innovation 
but effects vary across 
sectors 
Two-stage 
instrumental variable 
regression 
Griffith et al. (2010) 
Schengen Agreement 
boosted trade by 3% 
on average. More 
robust in goods than 
in services. 
Structural gravity 
model, taking 
Schengen agreement 
as a count variable 
measuring the 
number of Schengen 
border crossings. 
Felbermayr et al. 
(2018) 
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Driver of impact 
measured 
Estimation of increase 
in EU GDP /  
Economic Effects Methodology Source 
Free movement of 
services 
Trade in service was 
barely integrated 
Comparative analysis 
based on descriptive 
statistics 
Ilzkovitz et al. (2007) 
5% increase in intra-
EU trade in services 
from 1999 to 2005 
Gravity model Straathof et al. (2008) 
Price mark-ups 
increased in service 
sector 
Panel estimation, 10 
EU countries from 
1981-99 
Badinger (2007) 
Poor integration in the 
ICT market 
Using price disparity 
as a measure of 
market integration 
Pelkmans and Renda 
(2011) 
Free movement of 
capital 
Ratio of intra-EU FDI 
to total increased 
from 53% to 78% for 
inflows and from 50% 
to 66% for outflows 
Comparative analysis 
based on descriptive 
statistics 
Ilzkovitz et al. (2007) 
FDI between EU 
countries 28% higher 
than non-EU 
Gravity model, using 
data from 1981 to 
2005 
Straathof et al. (2008) 
Free movement of 
persons 
No significant effects 
on wages and 
employment rates 
Multilevel 
comparative analysis 
based on descriptive 
statistics 
Kahanec and 
Zimmermann (2009) 
Source: Bruegel based in large part on Alleweldt (2014) and Dahlberg (2015). 
3.3. Ex ante estimates of the benefits of the Digital Single Market (DSM) 
Numerous studies have assessed the benefits of the Single Market. Fewer have specifically addressed 
the benefits of the Digital Single Market (DSM), as embodied in the Commission’s 2015 Digital Single 
Market Strategy. Many of the initiatives in the DSM sought to ameliorate or eliminate barriers to 
e-commerce, for instance by simplifying VAT arrangements, harmonising consumer protection rules,
or reducing the cost of cross-border parcel delivery. Others sought to promote consumer trust in
e-commerce by ensuring privacy and network and information security. Still others sought to
promote e-government, or to facilitate the deployment of high capacity broadband network
infrastructure in order to ensure that Europeans have good access to the Digital Single Market.
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A noteworthy recent study23 using state-of-the-art analytic techniques found that if e-commerce sales 
of goods within the European Union were as easy and cost-effective as domestic sales, retail prices 
would decrease in all countries, both online (1 percent on average) and offline (0.5 percent on 
average). Consumer surplus (CS) in the EU would increase by 1.2 percent, primarily based on the 
reduction of the price paid for goods and to a lesser degree on the ability of consumers to choose 
from a wider range of goods. The study also found an increase of producer surplus (PS) of 1.4 percent, 
not only by reason of increased consumption resulting from price elasticity of demand, but also 
because of the reduced costs of supply – many purchases that are made from ‘bricks and mortar’ 
retailers today would instead be made online. The cost of producing the goods would be unchanged, 
but the cost of making the sale online would be less than the cost of making the equivalent sale 
offline. The DSM Strategy as enacted to date realises only about a quarter of this gain, as shown in 
Figure 8. We estimate that some € 31 billion per year in additional consumer gains alone remain to be 
realised. 
Figure 8. Approximate consumer surplus gains per year realised by DSM Strategy 
measures already agreed or in place versus further potentially realisable gains 
(billion euro). 
10.3 
31.4 
Consumer surplus gains realised
Potential further consumer surplus gains
Source: Bruegel based on Duch-Brown and Martens (2016). 
23  N. Duch-Brown and B. Martens (2016) ‘The economic impact of lifting geoblocking restrictions in the EU Digital single Market’, Digital 
Economy Working Paper 2016/02, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, European Commission. 
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We know of no comparable study for services. Indeed, there is a dearth in general of definitive studies 
on the impact of the free movement of services. 
In seeking to identify the indices of digitisation that might be most relevant to the gains provided by 
the DSM, we conducted our own fixed-effect regression of income on the indicators of digital 
readiness, as expressed by the Commission’s Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), on GDP (see the 
Annex to this report). These indices address (1) Connectivity (reflecting broadband deployment and 
quality), (2) Human Capital/Digital Skills, (3) Use of Internet Services by Citizens, (4) Integration of 
Digital Technology by Businesses, and (5) Digital Public Services (with a focus on e-Government and 
e-Health). We found that broadband and e-Government play a statistically significant role in
explaining GDP growth in the EU. The relationship does not prove causality, but in the case of
broadband infrastructure there is good reason to believe that there is a causal relationship.
Indeed, a great many studies have attempted to identify the societal benefits to GDP associated with 
the deployment and adoption of high speed broadband internet access services. These studies clearly 
demonstrate the benefits of broadband deployment and adoption. Whether they conclusively 
demonstrate the incremental benefits of ultra-fast broadband as compared to basic broadband is, 
however, debatable. The concise summary that appears in Cambini (2018) notes: 
• Röller and Waverman (2001, AER): An increase of 10% in the broadband penetration rate leads on
average to an increase of 2.8% of GDP growth (21 OECD countries).
• Koutroumpis (2009, JTPO): the average impact of broadband infrastructure on GDP is 0.63% (for
the EU‐15, in the period 2002–2007).
• Czernich et al. (2011, EJ): a 10% increase in the broadband penetration rate results in 1‐1.5%
increase in annual GDP per‐capita. Faster broadband = higher GDP growth.
• Work commissioned by DCMS (2013): fast broadband can add £17bn to UK’s annual GDP.
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4. BENEFITS OF SPECIFIC DSM STRATEGY INITIATIVES
In this chapter, we evaluate the various legislative measures that have been proposed or enacted 
pursuant to the Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy, including measures related to consumer 
protection. 
We begin by reviewing the taxonomy of legislative measures developed in a companion study to this 
one that addresses legal, as distinct from economic, aspects of DSM legislation (Section 4.1). This 
enables us to group the measures into seven broad categories. In addition, we consider a few pre-
2014 electronic communications measures for which estimates of societal benefits are readily 
available. 
We then follow in Section 4.2 with an explanation, category by category and legislative measure by 
legislative measure, of the benefits that can be assumed to be associated with each measure. We 
conclude in Section 4.3 with a tabular summary of these results, together with a simple summation of 
estimated benefits. As already explained in Chapter 1, this simple summation greatly overestimates 
the probable real benefits. In Chapter 4.4, we use broader measures to detect and to partially correct 
for estimation errors in the simple summation. 
4.1. A taxonomy of DSM measures 
We follow a taxonomy of legislative measures derived from that used in the companion study by 
de Streel and Hocepied (2019). The shadings (green or yellow) in Table 5 denote whether the 
measure in question is either enacted or has been substantially agreed (green), versus whether it is 
still being negotiated (yellow). 
The groupings of measures taken are carried forward into the economic analysis in Section 4.2. 
KEY FINDINGS 
We identify some € 176.6 billion in annual gains (in current euro) resulting from legislative 
measures enacted (or expected to be enacted) in the current legislative term once the 
measures are fully effective, corresponding to 1.2% of current (2017) GDP. This estimate is 
based on Commission Impact Assessments and other publicly available sources. 
The largest gains achieved flow from (1) electronic communications networks and services, based 
mainly on the EECC and secondarily on increased roaming due to RLAH, (2) data and AI, based 
mainly on the Directive on the re-use of public sector information, and secondarily on free flow of 
non/personal data and on GDPR; (3) e-commerce, content and online platforms, based on the 
Geo-Blocking Regulation, the VAT modernisation programme, and the Regulation on Cross-Border 
Parcel Delivery; and (4) e-Government, provided that the Single Digital Gateway is implemented 
well and widely used. 
The large benefits attributed to the EECC reflect various spill-overs into the overall digitisation of 
European society enabled by measures that promote the deployment of fibre-based fixed 
broadband and of 5G mobile services. 
We have also identified an additional € 87.9 billion in annual gains that might be realised by filling 
in gaps in the DSM Strategy as presently enacted. These are addressed in Chapter 5. 
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Table 5. Digital Single Market (DSM): Legal instruments adopted or proposed during the 8th Legislature (2014-2019). 
E-commerce, 
Content and 
online platforms 
Intellectual 
Property 
Data and AI24 Trust and security Consumer 
protection 
E-Government Electronic 
communications 
networks and 
services 
Regulation on 
cross-border 
portability of online 
content services 
(2017) 
Directive Trade 
Secret (2016) 
Regulation General 
Data Protection 
(2016) 
Reg. eIDAS (2014) Regulation on 
Consumer 
Protection 
Cooperation (2017)  
Regulation 
establishing a 
Single Digital 
Gateway (2018) 
Regulation Open 
Internet / roaming 
/ TSM (2015) 
Regulation 
addressing 
unjustified geo-
blocking (2018) 
Regulation and 
Directive permitted 
uses in copyright 
for print-disabled 
persons (2017) 
Regulation on Free 
flow of non-
personal data 
(2018) 
Directive on 
Network 
Information 
Security (2016) 
Directive on 
contracts for the 
supply of digital 
content - P2015 
Directive on the re-
use of public sector 
information 
(recast) P2018 
Decision on use of 
470-790 MHz 
frequency band 
(2017) 
Council Regulation 
and Directive VAT 
for e-Commerce 
(2018) 
Council Directive 
on VAT for 
e-publications
(2018) 
Council Regulation 
establishing the 
European High-
Performance 
Computing Joint 
Undertaking (2018) 
Regulation on the 
EU Cybersecurity 
Act – P2017 
Directive on 
contracts for sales 
of goods - P2015, 
M2017 
Regulation on 
wholesale roaming 
(2017) 
24 Also, Regulation on protection of personal data by the Union institutions and bodies – P2017. 
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E-commerce, 
Content and 
online platforms 
Intellectual 
Property 
Data and AI25 Trust and security Consumer 
protection 
E-Government Electronic 
communications 
networks and 
services 
Regulation on 
cross-border parcel  
delivery services 
(2018) 
Regulation on 
Copyright and 
broadcasting 
organisations – 
P2016 
Regulation 
e-privacy – P2017
Directive on the 
combatting fraud 
and counterfeiting 
of non-cash means 
of payment – 
P2017 
Directive Better 
enforcement and 
modernisation of 
EU consumer 
protection rules – 
P2018 
Regulation to 
promote Internet 
Connectivity in 
local communities 
(Wi-Fi4EU) (2017)  
Directive Audio-
Visual and Media 
Services (2018) 
Directive on 
copyright in the 
Digital Single 
Market – P2016 
Regulation 
e-evidence (P2018)
Directive Collective  
redress – P2018 
Directive on 
European 
Electronic 
Communications 
Code (2018) 
Payment Services 
Directive 2 (PDS2) 
(2015) 
Regulation EU 
Cybersecurity 
Centers (P2018) 
Regulation BEREC 
(2018) 
25 Also, Regulation on protection of personal data by the Union institutions and bodies – P2017 
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E-commerce, 
Content and 
online platforms 
Intellectual 
Property 
Data and AI26 Trust and security Consumer 
protection 
E-Government Electronic 
communications 
networks and 
services 
Regulation on 
promoting fairness 
and transparency 
for business users 
of online 
intermediation 
services – P2018 
Regulation on the 
implementation 
and functioning of 
the .eu Top Level 
Domain name – 
P2018 
Directive on the re-
use of public sector 
information 
(recast) P2018 
Source: Bruegel based on de Streel and Hocepied (2019), “Benefits of European Digital Single Market” 
Green:  Legislative acts enacted or agreed by the EU co-legislators  Yellow: Legislative acts proposed by the Commission and under negotiation among the EU co-legislators 
26 Also, Regulation on protection of personal data by the Union institutions and bodies – P2017 
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4.2. Benefits of the DSM Strategy measures enacted or proposed 
As noted in Section 1.3, we have attempted to sum the benefits associated with the DSM Strategy, 
consistent with Commission Impact Assessment reports, whether the benefits derive from Single 
Market considerations or have some other basis. 
In this section, we briefly review what is known about the likely benefits from each measure. In each 
case, we have reviewed the Commission’s ex ante Impact Assessment that the Commission submitted 
together with the legislative proposal. Unless otherwise indicated, the Impact Assessment did not 
provide a meaningful estimate of economic benefits. 
We have made adjustments to Commission estimates where we identified problems; however, since 
we have not gone back to primary data to do our own econometric assessments, our figures 
necessarily reflect the assumptions and any errors in the Commission estimates. 
Rather than quantifying benefits to date, we have attempted to provide a reasonable estimate of long 
term steady state benefits once the measure is fully and correctly implemented. Many of the 
measures have not yet been enacted. Even for those measures that have been enacted, they have not 
been in place long enough to enable meaningful ex post assessment. 
The estimates of benefits are relative to a “business as usual” scenario as might have been expected 
at the time the Commission made the initial legislative proposal, which provides a consistent 
counter-factual that is in line with the Commission’s Better Regulation principles and thus with the ex  
ante Impact Assessments that the Commission submitted. 
In light of the roughness of the underlying estimates in Impact Assessment reports and in the 
literature, we have not made explicit adjustments to take into account (1) inflation (which has been 
low in recent years) or (2) PPP adjustments that were not already present in estimates from 
Commission Impact Assessments. 
We have also made no adjustments to allow for Brexit, since as of this date there is no clarity as to 
what form (if any) Brexit will take. All estimates are thus EU28 estimates. 
Where a measure has been agreed or enacted, and where feasible, we have made rough adjustments 
to take into account the likely impact of any conspicuous differences between the measure that the 
Commission proposed (whose impacts are visible in the Impact Assessment) and the measure 
actually enacted. 
We do not attempt to assess the benefits of measures where political agreement has not yet been 
reached (except in cases where the impact is clearly de minimis). The uncertainty over what will be 
enacted is too great. 
The Commission’s Impact Assessments (referred to throughout this section as IA reports) and, where 
appropriate, legislative proposals are listed among the references at the end of this report. In the 
interest of brevity, they generally do not appear in footnotes in this section. 
In the subsequent sections of this study                                                                                                  , 
estimated yearly gains that are reflected in our estimates of steady state gains due to 
measures already enacted or agreed (and thus reflected in Table 6 and Figure 9) are highlighted 
by being placed in bold text. 
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
44 PE 631.044 
4.2.1. E-commerce, content and online platforms 
In this section, we consider benefits directly associated with e-commerce, measures associated with 
content and copyright, and measures that deal with online platforms. 
• Regulation on cross-border portability of online content services (2017): The gain to
European consumers is clear, but macroeconomic benefits are probably quite small.
• Regulation addressing unjustified geo-blocking (2018): Duch-Brown and Martens (2016)27
have estimated that eliminating all barriers to cross-border e-commerce would result in lower
consumer retail prices of 1% for goods sold online and 0.5% for goods sold offline. In the absence 
of quantitative data, we assume (as does the Commission’s Impact Assessment) that the same
holds true for services. We assume that the Geo-blocking Regulation covers only 40% of all
goods and services due to the exclusion from the non-discrimination provisions of (1)
copyrighted content and (2) goods that must be shipped cross-border. Annual benefits of € 2.4
billion euro could be expected for online sales of goods and services in 2018 based on current e-
commerce volumes, growing to as much as € 6.8 billion in 2025 based on the expected
increase in the volume of e-commerce.28 Gains of € 3.4 billion can be expected in 2018 from
sales of offline goods, but growth is likely to be offset by the increasing fraction of total retail
sales that online sales represent.29 Gains could be 2.5 times as great if it were possible to include
copyrighted content (especially audiovisual content) and goods that require shipment, but
doing so would require substantial new regulation with complicated consequences (see Section
5). We project total gains of € 10.3 billion.
• Council Regulation and Directive VAT for e-Commerce (2018): The legislative proposal claims
that the measure is “expected to reduce VAT compliance costs for businesses by EUR 2.3
billion a year from 2021 while at the same time increasing VAT revenues for Member States by
EUR 7 billion.” Compliance costs as estimated in the IA were based on a Standard Cost Model,
while macroeconomic impacts were estimated using a Computable General Equi l ibrium (CGE)
model. The IA estimated somewhat greater savings of between 14% and 18% of the € 68 bi l l ion
in annual VAT compliance costs incurred by SMEs.
• Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services (2018): Alleweldt et al. (2014) predicted
“savings of EUR 2.23 to EUR 5.57 billion per year due to lower prices”. The Commission’s
legislative proposal included measures to open up the cross-border parcel delivery services of 
national postal operators (NPOs) to commercial competitors, and to strengthen both powers and 
obligations for national postal regulatory authorities; however, these measures are omitted from
the measure as adopted. The Regulation makes a positive contribution to price transparency, but 
is unlikely to have significant macroeconomic effect. We assume annual benefits  of not  more
than € 1.0 billion.
27  Duch-Brown, N. and Martens, B. (2016), The Welfare effects of lifting geoblocking restrictions in the EU Digital single Market, JRC/IPTS 
Digital Economy Working Paper. 
28  This does not take into account the likely increase in the total volume of retail sales, nor inflation, nor the expected departure of the UK 
from the EU28. 
29  This is based on € 7,400 billion in retail sales per annum, and the assumption that the current Geo-Blocking Regulation applies to only 
10% of them due to the exclusion of goods that require shipment.
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• Directive Audio-Visual and Media Services (2018): The IA contains no significant economic
analysis of societal welfare impacts. It has a bit about administration and implementation
costs, which are de minimis. We assume annual gains of € 1.0 billion.
• Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online
intermediation services: Per the legislative proposal (which was introduced in Apri l  2018),
the Commission’s preferred approach is “estimated to be capable of reversing a dampening
effect on the online platform economy resulting from a lack of trust of business users
amounting to at least between EUR 0.81 billion and EUR 4.05 billion”. Since the proposal is
only at the beginning of the legislative process, we do not include it in the estimated total
gain.
• Regulation on the implementation and functioning of the .eu Top Level Domain name:
The .eu domain name has value, and modernisation is appropriate. The Commission’s
legislative proposal notes that “problem currently is not dramatic”. Macroeconomic benefi ts
are probably quite small.
• Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2): This has never been identified as a DSM Strategy
initiative, but it has a clear linkage to online e-commerce. First, it reduces the limit on
consumer liability for unauthorised use of credit cards to €50 from the previous €150. Second,
and probably even more important, it eliminates surcharges for the use of a consumer credit
or debit card. It is complemented by complemented by Regulation (EU) 2015/751, which puts
a cap on wholesale interchange fees (MIFs) charged between banks for card-based
transactions (a necessary prerequisite to the elimination of retail surcharges).
In sum, we estimate aggregate annual steady state gains once the measures take full effect as being 
comprised of € 5.8 billion for the Geo-Blocking Regulation with likely growth to at least € 10.2 bi l l ion 
in 2025 due to the growth in online sales, € 2.3 billion for the VAT measures, € 1.0 billion for the 
Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery, and € 1.0 billion for the revised AVMS Directive, for a sum 
of € 14.6 billion per year once the measures have taken full effect (computed in current euro). As for 
the impacts of other measures in this group, they are either small enough to ignore, or e lse  too new 
(and thus too uncertain) to estimate. 
4.2.2. Intellectual Property 
In this section, we deal with measures related to intellectual property including copyright. 
• Directive Trade Secrets (2016): Consistent handling makes economic sense. There are gains, 
to be sure, but the IA contains no analysis of impacts.
• Regulation and Directive on permitted uses in copyright for print-disabled persons
(2017): This is meritorious, but the economic impact is unlikely to be large.
• Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market: The measure provides for simpl ified
acquisition of multi-country rights, but does not deal with vertical restrictions. The overall
effects are difficult to assess without knowing what will be enacted by the co-legislators in the
end. The Parliament has reached consensus, but portions continue to be hotly debated. 
• Regulation on copyright and broadcasting organisations: For purposes of this analysis,
the impacts of this measure are included with those of the analysis of the Directive on
Copyright.
• Council Directive on VAT for e-publications: We treat the benefits of this measure as being
covered under the Council Regulation and Directive VAT for e-Commerce (2018).
The Directive on Trade Secrets (2016) may possibly prove to be economically significant, but we have 
not located any quantitative assessment.  
IPOL | Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 
46 PE 631.044 
For the Directive on Copyright, it is too soon to make an assessment. The other measures in this 
group either are covered together with other measures under other headings. 
4.2.3. Data and AI 
This topic considers data aspects, especially including data protection. Various topics such as artificial 
intelligence, the Internet of Things, and cloud computing also fall within this group; however, action 
to date has generally consisted of strategic thinking and Horizon 2020 projects rather than full blown 
legislative measures. 
• General Data Protection Regulation (2016): The GDPR is unquestionably one of the most
significant items of legislation during the current legislative term. In terms of protection of
consumer privacy rights, it represents a landmark. The IA (2012) for the GDPR presents very
little analysis of the economic impact, and claims annual savings of a mere € 2.3 billion in
administrative costs for EU businesses. Meanwhile, Deloitte (2013) claims that GDPR could
potentially reduce EU GDP by € 173 billion, or 1.3% of EU GDP. We have not specifically taken
this claim into account in our estimates.
• Regulation on the free flow of non-personal data (2018): The IA anticipates substantial
benefits to European business and consumers, but does not compute their value in euro.
“Based on the approximate number of Open Data jobs in 2016 and assuming their increase at
a rate of 7.3%, it is expected that additional 25,000 direct Open Data jobs could be created in
the period 2016-2020. … [A]pplying Open Data in transport services can save 629 million
hours of unnecessary waiting time on the road in the EU and possibly lead to saving 1,425
lives a year (i.e. 5.5% of the European road fatalities).” Applying Okun’s Law to the number of
full time jobs in the EU and the GDP of the EU (both based on Eurostat data for 2016), the jobs
added correspond to an increase in GDP of some € 4.3 billion per annum.
• Directive on the re-use of public sector information: The proposed amendments would 
address significant gaps. The scope would be expanded to cover a wide range of public or
publicly funded data in the utilities and transport sectors, as well as publicly funded research.
The scope for derogations from cost-based charges for data would be clarified and reduced.
Recognising the growing importance of real time access to dynamic public data, the creation
of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) would be mandated. The IA credibly estimates 
savings of € 45 billion per year in 2028 through the creation of new lines of business,
and the reduction of costs for public agencies themselves.30 We make the optimistic
assumption that these measures will either be enacted during the current legislative  term or
else shortly thereafter.
• Regulation e-privacy: The revised e-privacy Directive is not assessed because it is still subject
to intense debate.
• Council Regulation establishing the European High-Performance Computing Joint
Undertaking: The direct effects of this initiative are small compared to other initiatives
discussed here, since HPC is essentially a niche market. Spill-overs might conceivably be
significant, but the IA makes no attempt to quantify benefits, and in any case the spill-overs
30 A preparatory study for the IA sees the potential for still greater gains. (Barbero et al., 2018) 
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could for the most part be achieved by spending more on supercomputers manufactured in 
the US, China or Japan. The main advantages are probably geopolitical, not economic. 
• Artificial Intelligence: Proposals have been made, but it is far too early to estimate effects.
The quantifiable gains consist primarily of annual gains of € 45 billion due to the creation of new lines 
of business and to savings on the part of public agencies thanks to amendments to the Directive on 
the re-use of public sector information, an annual cost reduction of € 2.3 billion in administrative 
costs, and an increase in GDP of € 4.3 billion per annum thanks to new jobs created through the 
Regulation on the free flow of non-personal data, for a total of € 51.6 billion per annum. 
4.2.4. Trust and security 
As with privacy, enhanced network and information security seeks to increase trust in electronic 
applications, and thus to increase societal welfare. 
• Regulation on electronic identification and trust services (eIDAS) (2014): The Regulation
seeks to ensure mutual recognition of electronic signatures, timestamps, and seals, thus
making electronic documents legally valid across Member State borders. The programme
addresses requirements that have been identified as being crucial  for electronic services in
general, and for e-government in particular; (Marcus et al., 2013) however, it has not
produced much to date. (ENISA, 2017) Many of the Member States operate eID systems, but
only eleven have pre-notified or notified eID schemes under eIDAS.31 Once critical mass has
been reached, benefits of this potentially important programme may be more visible. In any
case, the IA provides no estimate of economic benefits. eIDAS has the potential to contribute
to cross-border e-commerce and e-government, the gains from which are already recognised 
in conjunction with other measures.
• Directive on Network Information Security (2016): Per the IA, “a reinforced instrument
supporting capabilities, prevention, cooperation and awareness at EU level, and therefore
designed to increase overall EU cyber resilience, will have a positive economic impact by
helping to reduce the costs of cybersecurity/cybercrime incidents, for which the estimated 
economic impact in the Union stands at 0.41% of EU GDP (i.e. around EUR 55 billion).” What is
not expressed is the degree to which these measures are likely to reduce the cost of
cybersecurity/cybercrime incidents; moreover, this would be hard to measure ex post, since
the counter-factual is highly speculative. ENISA plays an important role in EU cybersecurity,
but the actual reduction in losses directly attributable to ENISA is unlikely to exceed € 4
billion per annum. Its role to date has largely entailed coordination, multi-national exercises,
and exchange of best practice.
• Regulation on the EU Cybersecurity Act: This act, which seeks to strengthen ENISA and to
give it responsibility in regard to certification of cybersecurity offerings, represents an
important and positive step. The certification programme is likely to pose a range of
challenges.
31  See Marina Kirova and Marie Eichholtzer (2018), Overview of pre-notified and notified eID Schemes under eIDAS at:
http://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/EIDCOMMUNITY/Overview+of+pre-notified+and+notified+eID+schemes
+under+eIDAS 
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• Directive on the combatting of fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment:
The issue is important, but it is not necessarily a Single Market issue. In any event, the
measure has not yet been enacted or politically agreed.
In the absence of hard data, we somewhat arbitrarily assume an overall net reduction in losses due to 
cybersecurity of some € 4 billion per annum. 
4.2.5. E-Government 
The relationship between e-Government and GDP was noted in Section 3.3. 
• Regulation establishing a Single Digital Gateway (2018): “… businesses could save
between EUR 11 and 55 billion annually for researching just nine business topics. The
preferred option would reduce by 60% the 1.5 million hours that citizens currently spend on
researching online seven essential topics before going abroad.”
We somewhat arbitrarily assume that the potential benefits for the identified e-government 
initiatives are some € 20 billion per annum thanks to the benefits of the Single Digital Gateway;32 
however, this estimate is highly sensitive both to the quality of implementation of the gateway, and 
to the degree to which it is actually used. 
4.2.6. Consumer protection 
Europe benefits from a nominally harmonised set of horizontal, sector-independent consumer 
protection measures. These measures fail, however, to establish full harmonisation. Member States 
can and do go beyond the requirements of the horizontal instruments now in place.”Gold plating” of 
rules on the part of the Member States raises compliance costs for cross-border e-merchants. 
• Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation (2017): The cooperation is clearly in
order, but the macroeconomic gains are probably limited. In the absence of data, we assume
the gains to be in the range of € 0.3 billion per annum.
• Directive on contracts for the supply of digital content: This is one of the key measures
that seeks to implement maximum harmonisation for consumer protection; however, it is not
yet in force. GHK (2014) identifies three enhancements to the Consumer Rights Directive
(CRD) that could potentially generate € 5.9 billion per year in consumer benefits (see Section
5.2.1), with extension to cover gambling providing the lion’s share. Alleweldt et al. (2014) cites
GHK (2014) in claiming that further extending EU consumer protection to cover financial
services, passenger travel, healthcare and real estate could bring additional gains of € 52
billion annually, but these claims are unsubstantiated and inconsistent. The potential to
achieve gains in this way may be substantial, but considerable work would be required, as we
explain in Section 5.2.1.
32 See also part 3 of the IA: European Commission (2017), Completing the Better Regulation Agenda: Better solutions for better results, 
COM(2017) 651 final; and the legislative proposal. 
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• Directive on contracts for sales of goods:  This is another key measure that seeks to
implement maximum harmonisation for consumer protection. It is likewise not yet in force.
• Directive Better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection rules:  This
proposed measure would update and modernise two existing consumer protection
Directives, and would update penalties in two more to ensure that they have sufficient
dissuasive effect. The enhancements appear to be fully appropriate, but the economic gain
compared to the existing legislative is likely to be small.
• Directive Collective redress: This legislative proposal strengthens consumer rights. Its
deterrent effect against corporate misconduct might prove to be substantial in practice, but is 
difficult to quantify.
The consumer protection measures are important, but the economic impact of the measures 
proposed to date is not likely to be large – we somewhat arbitrarily assign a value of € 0.3 billion per 
annum.  
On the other hand, GHK (2014) identified potential savings of up to € 5.9 billion per annum if the 
Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) or its successors were enhanced to cover gambling and to fi l l  other 
gaps, and Alleweldt et al. (2014) conjectures that substantially greater gains might be achieved by 
covering financial services, healthcare, real estate and passenger travel. 
4.2.7. Electronic communications networks and services 
Numerous measures comprise this group. The TSM (which builds on previous Roaming Regulations) 
and the EECC (which builds on and replaces the Directives that comprised the Regulatory Framework 
for Electronic Communications (RFEC)) are likely to have greatest economic impact. 
• Regulation Open Internet/TSM (2015): The measure actually enacted contained only two
elements from a much larger Commission proposal: (1) network neutrality and (2) Roam Like
at Home mobile roaming. The net neutrality aspects helped to provide legal certainty and to
mitigate potential fragmentation, but probably produce negligible economic benefits
because incidents prior to enactment were already rare to non-existent, and little
enforcement has been required subsequent to enactment. Roam Like at Home has been
welcomed by the public, and simplifies arrangements for consumers, but much of the
potential economic benefit had already been achieved with the roaming regulations of 2007,
2009, and 2012 (as explained later in this section). The large increase in consumption of
roaming data33 suggests a gain in societal welfare; however, there is no solid basis on which
to estimate its magnitude, since BEREC no longer collects data on the price of roaming
services, and since the incremental cost to network operators of carrying the data is known to
only a limited degree. We assume benefits of € 5 billion per annum, which is roughly in l ine
with benefits achieved by the Roaming Regulation of 2009 (as explained later in this section).
33 Total roaming traffic for the EEA (28 Member States plus Norway and Liechtenstein) jumped from 2142 million minutes of calls made and 
1794 minutes of calls received in 2Q2017 (before RLAH took effect) to 5514 million minutes of calls made and 4326 mi l li on mi nute s of 
calls received in 3Q2017. The jump in consumption of data services was even more dramatic – they increased from 26 million GB in 
2Q2017 to 95 million GB in 3Q2017. BEREC (2018), “International Roaming: BEREC Benchmark Data Report, April 2017 - September 2017 ” , 
BoR (18) 31. 
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• Decision on use of 470-790 MHz frequency band (2017): The IA estimates the value of 700
MHz spectrum to MNOs to be some € 11 billion, which must be taken net of costs to
consumers to up DVB-T2 compliant televisions or set-top boxes of € 0.6 to € 1.3 billion plus
various other transition costs and then annualised based on an average lease duration of
some 15 years.34 These gains are subsumed within those estimated for the European
Electronic Communications Code.
• Regulation on wholesale roaming (2017): The net benefits are subsumed within the overall
benefits for the Regulation Open Internet/TSM (2015).
• Regulation to promote Internet Connectivity in local communities (Wi-Fi4EU) (2017):
The societal benefits are clear, but in light of the small volume of public investment foreseen
(€ 120 million for 2017 through 2020), we assume that the macroeconomic impact is minor.
• Directive on European Electronic Communications Code (2018): The IA (especially
Chapter 4 and Annex 5) identifies the following:
o A potential 0.54% increase in GDP compared with the status quo by 2025 based on
improved fixed broadband connectivity thanks to facilitation of co-investment and
wholesale-only business models, plus a range of procedural improvements.
o Benefits of € 146.5 billion per annum from the introduction of 5G capabilities, of which
€ 95.9 billion will arise from first order benefits in the four key vertical segments that
depend on 5G: automotive, healthcare, transport and utilities. They estimate an upl i ft of 
0.16% of 2025 GDP. Our belief is that these benefits flow not only from timely re lease of 
spectrum to the market, but also from measures to facilitate the deployment of small
cells and to address stringent limits on radiation (EMF) that may not be scientifically
justified.
o Improvements in service efficiency that will result in an uplift of 0.74% to 2025 GDP. This
estimate is based on Haidar (2012),35 and is in our judgment highly suspect to the extent
that it estimates societal gains solely on the basis of the number of reforms undertaken,
and not on their substance.
In estimating benefits, we assume (1) that only half of the projected broadband access benefits will 
be achieved as a direct consequence of the EECC, while the rest will depend on follow-up actions 
based on gaps that will be identified once the EECC is in place; (2) that the gains from spectrum policy 
will be achieved in full; and (3) that any direct gains that the EECC realises from service efficiency 
improvements other than fixed and mobile deployment are unlikely to exceed 0.10% of GDP.  
If one were to take into account indirect gains in productivity, the benefits might perhaps be 
substantially larger. 
34 The IA also notes that revenue from connected cars revenue in the EU28 is expected to reach around € 25 billion in 2020, mainly based on 
driver assistance and safety applications. Deployment and uptake of connected cars services is clearly dependent on the availability of 
ubiquitous connectivity and could benefit from the introduction of 5G IoT components for connected cars by 2020. mHealth could save  
€ 99 billion in healthcare costs in the EU and could add € 93 billion to the EU GDP in 2017 alongside an improvement in patient welfare. 
35 Haidar J. I. (2012) "The impact of business regulatory reforms on economic growth", Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 
26 (2012), pp. 285-307. 
Contribution to Growth: European Digital Single Market: Delivering economic benefits to citizens and businesses 
PE 631.044 51 
Based on 2017 EU28 GDP of € 15,300 billion (Eurostat),36 this implies gains of € 81 billion per year 
once the measures have taken full effect, with the potential for an additional € 41 billion through 
further improvements in fixed access regulation. 
• Regulation BEREC (2018): Provides procedural enhancements but does not directly impact
societal welfare. 
In addition, benefits from various measures already in place in 2013 have previously been estimated, 
and are included here to provide context:37 
• Reduction in Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs): The gains in consumer surplus due to
regulation of mobile call termination rates under the Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications (2002) and the Recommendation of 2009 have been estimated to reflect an
annual reduction in deadweight loss of € 6.1 billion from 2005 through 2010, and a welfare
transfer from MNOs to consumers of € 34.2 billion.38
• Reduction in International Mobile Roaming (IMR) prices: The impact of the Roaming
Regulations of 2007 and 2009 were estimated in the IA for the Roaming Regulation39 to
represent an annual gain in consumer welfare of some € 6.2 billion, comprised of an annual
reduction in deadweight loss of € 4.5 billion and an annual welfare transfer from network
operators to consumers of € 1.7 billion.
The gains from the EECC play the largest role here, and indeed play the largest role of any single DSM 
measure. We assume increases of € 81 billion per year once the measures have taken full effect, with 
the potential for an additional € 41 billion through further improvements in fixed access regulation 
(in 2018 euro and subject to the same assumptions used throughout). We assume an additional € 5 
billion per annum in benefits from the roaming aspects of the TSM Regulation, for a total of € 86.1 
billion. 
4.3. Summary of overall benefits 
In this section, we summarise the benefits from each of the measures that comprise the DSM, limiting 
ourselves however to measures that have already been enacted or that we expect to be enacted 
during the current term. 
For each DSM Strategy legislative measure for which it is possible to compute benefits on this basis, 
the estimated net annual benefits, by category and by measure, appear in Table 6. The rationale for 
36  Note that this ignores growth in GDP over time, inflation, and the expected departure of the UK from the EU28. 
37  J. Scott Marcus, Ilsa Godlovitch, Pieter Nooren, Bram van den Ende, Jonathan Cave and Werner Neu (2013),How to Build a Ubiquitous EU 
Digital Society, study for the European Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/518736/IPOL-
ITRE_ET(2013)518736_EN.pdf. 
38  J. Scott Marcus, Ilsa Godlovitch, Pieter Nooren, Bram van den Ende, Jonathan Cave and Werner Neu (2013),How to Build a Ubiquitous EU 
Digital Society, study for the European Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/ 51 87 36 /I POL-
ITRE_ET(2013)518736_EN.pdf. 
39  European Commission (2011), ‘Impact Assessment of Policy Options in Relation to the Commission's Review of the Functioning of 
Regulation (EC) No 544/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 on Roaming on Public Mobile Te l ephone 
Networks within the Community’, SEC(2011) 870 final. Analysis conducted by Steffen Hörnig. 
each of the values that appear in the table appears in the corresponding bulleted text in Section 4.2, 
highlighted in bold. 
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Table 6:  Estimated annual benefits of selected legal instruments adopted or proposed during 
the 8th Legislature (2014-2019) (billions of 2018 euro) when fully implemented. 
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E-commerce, content and online platforms    14.6  36.4 
Regulation addressing unjustified geo-blocking (2018)   10.3  31.4 
Council Regulation and Directive VAT for e-Commerce (2018)   2.3 - 
Regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services (2018)    1.0    5.0  
Directive Audio-Visual and Media Services (2018) 1.0 - 
Data and AI 51.6 - 
Directive on the re-use of public sector information (recast) P2018 45.0 - 
Regulation on Free flow of non-personal data (2018) 4.3 - 
General Data Protection Regulation (2016) 2.3 - 
Trust and security 4.0 - 
Directive on Network Information Security (2016) 4.0 - 
E-Government 20.0 - 
Regulation establishing a Single Digital Gateway (2018) 20.0 - 
Consumer protection 0.3 5.9 
Directive on contracts for the supply of digital content - P2015 0.3 5.9 
Electronic communications networks and services   86.1  41.0 
Directive on European Electronic Communications Code (2018)    81.1 41.0 
Regulation Open Internet/TSM (2015)   5.0 - 
Total: 176.6 83.7 
  Source: Bruegel estimates based on European Commission Impact Assessment reports and other sources identified in Section 4.2.  
There are substantial uncertainties in all of these figures, but it nonetheless seems fairly clear that the 
largest gains achieved flow from (1) the electronic communications networks and services groups, 
based mainly on the EECC and secondarily on increased roaming due to RLAH, (2) the data and AI 
group, based mainly on the Directive on the re-use of public sector information, and secondarily on 
free flow of non/personal data and on GDPR; (3) the e-commerce, content and online platforms group 
based on the Geo-Blocking Regulation, the VAT modernisation programme, and the Regulation on 
Cross-Border Parcel Delivery; and (4) the e-Government group, provided that the Single Digital 
Gateway is implemented well and widely used. The large benefits attributed to the EECC reflect 
various spill-overs into the overall digitisation of European society enabled by measures that promote 
the deployment of fibre-based fixed broadband and of 5G mobile services. 
We find overall annual benefits of € 176.6 billion from the measures enacted once the measures 
have taken full effect, based on the assumptions used throughout. 
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Some legislative measures are likely to contribute far more than others to gains. Our estimates, 
grouped by the thematic area with the measure is associated, appear in Figure 9. We note once again 
that there is considerable uncertainty in each of these estimates. 
Figure 9. Annual benefits achievable based on measures already finished or in progress 
(in billions of current euro once the measures have taken full effect).  
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Source: Bruegel based on European Commission Impact Assessment reports and other sources identified in Section 4.2. 
We see the potential to expand these gains further by filling gaps in the legislative measures enacted 
in the current term, and additional opportunities at EU level to further the digitisation of Europe (see 
Section 5). 
4.4. Reconciliation of the estimates 
A simple summation of the benefits of each of the measures that collectively comprise the DSM risks 
over-stating the actual gains. Each of the measures appears to contribute to overall societal gains; 
however, the gains that have been estimated in ex ante Impact Assessment reports and elsewhere 
generally assume that the other measures are also in force, and working as intended. In other words, 
each measure may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the realisation of the hoped-for gain. 
This implies that the same gains might be counted many times. 
As noted in Section 1.3, we have attempted to address this concern (1) by applying our own sanity 
checks to each of the estimates made in IA documents and elsewhere, (2) by correcting for double-
counting as we ran the sums of individual programmes, and (3) by checking the reasonableness of 
the bottom-up sum against other measures. The last of these is the task of this section of the report. 
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As previously noted, the gains from all DSM Strategy measures collectively can be assumed to derive 
from a limited number of large-scale effects, including: 
• Elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, especially e-commerce, which enhances
the efficiency of the Single Market for goods and for services.
o Resultant reduction in prices paid (i.e. reduced mark-ups).
o Increased variety of products and services available to consumers.
o Increased competitiveness.
• Increased consumer willingness to use online services due to increased trust.
• Improved efficiency thanks to digitisation.
The combined effects of all DSM measures cannot exceed the expected combined effects through 
these channels of influence. Indeed, comparison of ex ante expectations of the gains from the Single  
Market as predicted in the Cecchini (1988) report with subsequent ex post estimates suggests that 
actual achieved gains, even after many years, often are substantially less than the maximum potential 
gains. 
In a number of cases, we have overall estimates of the gains that could potentially be achieved. 
The benefits from increased e-commerce operate through increased consumer choice and lower 
prices, not only for goods and services purchased online, but also for goods and services purchased 
offline. In the case of goods, Duch-Brown and Martens (2016) provide a reasonable estimate of the 
maximum magnitude of gains if cross-border purchases were as easy as domestic as a function of the 
total retail sale of goods. For services, we know of no corresponding quantitative assessment, so we 
follow the practice of the Commission (in the Impact Assessment for the Geo-Blocking Regulation) in 
assuming that the magnitude of savings for services is similar to that for goods. Since these gains 
were based on past data, the reductions can be assumed to represent gains since that time, which 
thus correspond roughly to gains in the current term and extrapolated forward. 
The gains from digitisation are presumably already partially achieved, since industries have been 
digitised to some degree. These gains can be assumed to be included in all estimates of gains in Total  
Factor Productivity (TFP) to date, and those anticipated going forward. 
The gains from increased trust in online commerce and elsewhere are presumably included in the 
first two categories. 
In Section 4.3, we identified overall annual benefits of € 176.6 billion from the measures enacted 
once the measures have taken full effect. This ex ante prediction is expressed in current euro, with no 
adjustment for inflation. Where IA estimates were expressed as a percentage of GDP, we used 2017 
GDP (the latest historically available from Eurostat) of € 15,300 billion. 
Most of the top down estimates in the literature are expressed as a fraction of GDP. The bottom-up 
estimate represents 1.2% of current (i.e. 2017) GDP. Given that any conversions from GDP to euro 
that were made in computing this number were based on current GDP, this is the appropriate  figure 
to use. 
It appears that this bottom-up estimate, in conjunction with the corrections made in conducting the 
bottom-up analysis, falls within a plausible range when checked against various top-down estimates 
of Single Market benefits. 
Cecchini (1988), for instance, predicted growth of 4.25-6.5% in GDP in the long run, with the upper 
end of the range dependent on additional supporting measures; ex post analysis suggests that less 
has been achieved, which implies that there is room to grow.  
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In any event, the gains from these measures go beyond those that could have been foreseen in 1988. 
The estimate of 1.2% of GDP does not appear to be unreasonable. 
Straathof et al. (2008)40 identified a long-run effect on EU GDP of the increased openness attributable 
to the common market ranging from 2.5% to 10%, of which two thirds are yet to be realised. This 
again suggests that the overall estimate of 1.2% is in a range that is not implausible. 
Finally, to the extent that societal welfare benefits (e.g. from enhanced broadband) manifest as gains 
in Total Factor Productivity (TFP), gains of 1.2% of GDP again seem reasonable. 
Based on this thought process, there is no need to apply further corrections to the bottom-up 
estimate of € 140.1 billion once the measures have taken full effect. 
40 As summarised in Dahlberg (2015). 
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5. POSSIBLE INITIATIVES TO REALISE MORE OF THE POTENTIAL
OF THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET
KEY FINDINGS 
We see opportunities for a number of further interventions in the coming legislative term. They 
fall in three categories: (1) re-thinking the overall approach to the Digital Single Market going 
forward, (2) rounding out and completing the measures enacted during the current legislative 
term, and (3) launching new initiatives to foster the digitisation of European business, 
government and society. 
As far as a re-thinking of the approach, we offer the following reflections: 
• For Single Market issues, a holistic view that integrates digital and pre-digital aspects
may be in order; however, promoting the adoption and innovation based on digital
technology continues to require a special focus of its own.
• The ultimate goal is the achievement of a dynamic EU economy that delivers a high
standard of living to all, and that provides attractive prices and choices to consumers.
The Single Market, the competitiveness of the EU, and the productivity gains achieved 
by digitisation are a means to achieving this end.
• Despite the growing difficulty in distinguishing between products and services, more
focus on Single Market gains relating to services is needed during the next legislative
term.
• A more integrated view across the EU’s full range of policy tools is needed, including
industrial, regulatory, competition, and trade policy. However, we cannot compromise 
the independence, the integrity and the credibility of regulatory and competition
policy.
We have provided a rough subjective assessment of how the candidate initiatives that we have 
identified for the next legislative term differ from one another in terms of costs and benefits, 
subsidiarity challenges, and more. We also distinguish between those that could be acted on 
now, versus those where extensive study is needed to identify a way forward. The initiatives are: 
• Public funding for AI and robotics;
• Private funding for start-ups and scale-ups;
• Corporate taxation;
• Training;
• Employment and social protection;
• E-government;
• Network and information security;
• Cross-border sales of goods that require delivery; 
• Re-think the structure of the EU audio-visual sector;
• Expand the scope of consumer protection;
• Further improve access regulation;
• Lower cross-border parcel delivery NPO prices;
• Liability and new technologies;
• Fake news and inappropriate content; and
• Detecting collusion.
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In considering possible initiatives to realise more of the potential of the digital single market, we 
reflect first on the overall approach going forward to the Digital Single Market (Section 5.1), then on 
steps to round out or complete the measures enacted during the current legislative term (Section 
5.2), and finally on new initiatives to foster the digitisation of European business, government and 
society (Section 5.3). In Section 5.4, we close with a comparative assessment of the candidate 
measures that we have put forward. 
5.1. The overall approach to the Digital Single Market going forward 
The pace of technological and market evolution in Europe has been rapid over the past five years. As 
we approach the next legislative term, it is natural to consider to what extent the EU’s overall 
approach to the DSM is ripe for re-thinking. 
A 2018 Presidency discussion paper on the Future of the Single Market (Council of the European 
Union, 2018b, also 2018c) provides a useful starting point for this discussion, but it surely will not 
represent the end of the discussion (nor was it intended to). If anything, the discussion paper 
demonstrates that it is easier to make broad pronouncements than it is to reduce them to practical 
policy measures. 
Perhaps the most useful proposition put forward in the discussion paper is that “there is no need for a 
Digital Single Market but rather for a digitised Single Market.” They go on to float the idea of the 
“appointment of a European Commission vice-president in charge of the Single Market in order to 
guarantee a cross-cutting approach.” (see also Lisbon Council, 2018) In support of this thought, we 
would observe that referring to a Digital Single Market implies that there is a non-Digital Single 
Market. Is this really the case today? All Single Market issues are to some degree digital, or ought to 
be. 
The boundaries of the Digital Single Market have never been altogether clear, but we have argued 
throughout that two main threads are visible in the actions undertaken in the current legislative term: 
(1) improved realisation of the benefits of the Single Market, and (2) the fostering of further
digitisation in the EU. For the former, the suggestion that it is no longer helpful to think of a Digital
Single Market seems to be timely. For the latter, however, its very essence is the need to promote
innovation based on digital technologies – as the discussion paper itself argues, it “will be crucial to
address the EU productivity challenge by fully exploiting the opportunities of the next digital tech
wave”.
In other words, for Single Market issues, a more holistic view that integrates digital and pre-
digital aspects may be in order; however, promoting the adoption and innovation based on 
digital technology continues to require a special focus of its own. 
The Single Market has taken on symbolic significance for EU policymakers, but it should not be 
viewed as a goal in and of itself; rather it is a means to an end. The discussion paper speaks of shifting 
the focus to EU competitiveness, but this is likewise a means to an end. The ultimate goal is the 
achievement of a dynamic EU economy that delivers a high standard of living to all, and that provides 
attractive prices and choices to consumers. The Single Market seeks to contribute to this goal by 
means of scale economies and reduced transaction costs. The focus on digitisation contributes to the 
same goal by driving increases in productivity, thereby enhancing EU competitiveness that 
contributes to EU exports. 
The discussion papers (Council of the European Union, 2018b and 2018c) also reflect on the 
distinction between products and services, rightly noting that they are increasingly intertwined.  
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It then calls for an increased focus on services (and also on data). There is an obvious tension between 
these two claims, and yet both are clearly in order. The difficulty in distinguishing between products 
and services notwithstanding, it is nonetheless fairly clear that the Single Market has been much 
more effective as regards goods than services. (Dahlberg et al., 2015) Given that services represent 
roughly 70% of the EU marketplace in terms of value added and employment, more focus is needed 
on Single Market gains relating to services during the next legislative term. 
The discussion papers (Council of the European Union, 2018b and 2018c) argue that a holistic 
approach is needed that integrates all policies, and that all policies must be fit for the digital age. The 
need for joined up policies is in order, but it is already recognised in Better Regulation principles in 
the form of coherence. Where concretely are current policies not sufficiently integrated, and what can 
be done to better integrate them? 
We suggest that the overall relationship between industrial policy, regulatory policy, competition 
policy and trade policy needs some re-thinking during the coming legislative term. There has always 
been some tendency or at least risk of our trading partners using or abusing nominally objective 
policy instruments for their own gain, and to the detriment of the EU. With the multilateral economic 
order under threat on all sides today, the EU will need better tools with which to defend its interests 
going forward. This likely requires a more integrated view across the full range of policy tools: 
industrial policy, regulatory policy, competition policy and trade policy. How to achieve an 
integrated approach without compromising the independence, the integrity and the credibility of 
regulatory and competition policy, however, will require careful consideration (which is touched on in 
Section 5.3.2). 
5.2. Rounding out the measures enacted during the current legislative 
term 
As noted in Section 4.3, we see the potential to further expand the gains from the DSM Strategy 
measures enacted, or expected to be enacted, by means of: 
• expanding the scope of consumer protection to include financial services, passenger travel,
healthcare and real estate;
• enhancements in access regulation to more fully realise the broadband investment that the
EECC attempted;
• revising a range of legal instruments so as to make it possible to expand the Geo-Blocking
Regulation so as to include goods that require delivery;
• initiating wide-ranging industrial policy measures to strengthen the global competitiveness
of the European audiovisual sector, which would be a necessary prerequisite to expanding
the Geo-Blocking Regulation to include services that primarily deliver copyrighted audiovisual 
content; and
• enhancing the Regulation of Cross-Border Parcel Delivery to mandate more competitive
pricing, mainly on the part of National Postal Operators.
All of these are aspects of the DSM Strategy that could not be addressed by the current set of 
legislative measures, often because prerequisites were not yet in place.  
Most of these changes are hard. Some require deep analysis before it would be appropriate to 
attempt to propose legislative measures. 
Some of the suggestions in this section are fairly radical, but they are firmly grounded. Many of the 
opportunities identified here are likely to be politically sensitive and challenging, which l ikely is the 
reason why they have not already been implemented. 
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At the same time, we have intentionally stopped short of providing detailed proposals. If a decision 
were taken to seriously explore any of these opportunities, a detailed Impact Assessment would be 
warranted. 
In addition to the candidate enhancements explicitly identified here, one should expect that there 
will be further opportunities to address gaps or shortcomings in the legislation that has already been 
tabled but not yet enacted. 
5.2.1. Expanding the scope of consumer protection 
In an annex to Alleweldt et al. (2014), GHK (2014) claims a very substantial potential gain of € 5.9 
billion in societal welfare by addressing certain gaps in consumer protection. The gaps that they 
identify are: 
• Gaps concerning commercial guarantees;
• Gaps concerning reverse type transactions;
• Gaps concerning consumer-to-consumer (C2C) transactions;
• Gaps in the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD);
• Gaps in the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD);
• Gaps concerning gambling activities;
• Problems concerning the limited scope of the E-commerce Directive; and
• Problems relating to digital content.
They identify three measures for which they quantified potential gains: 
• Commercial guarantees     €     36 
• Limited scope of the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) €   285
• Lack of a single market for gambling € 5,560 
 Total € 5,881 
GHK (2014) goes on to claim additional potential gains of € 52 billion by further extension of the EU 
consumer protection acquis, but they provide no substantiation. Alleweldt (2014) conjectures that 
this gain might be achieved by extending the Consumer Rights Directive to also cover the financial 
services, passenger travel, healthcare and real estate sectors. 
Extension of consumer protection to cover financial services, passenger travel, healthcare and real 
estate might indeed bring benefits, but the magnitude would need to be studied, and there are 
significant complexities in each of these sectors. Regulation of services is generally more complex 
than regulation of goods. For a discussion of the Commission’s thinking as regards consumer 
protection for financial services, for instance, see European Commission (2015c).41 
41 European Commission (2015), Green Paper on retail financial services: Better products, more choice, and greater opportunities for 
consumers and businesses, COM(2015) 630 final.
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5.2.2. Further enhancing broadband deployment, adoption and usage 
The European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) represents the latest in a sequence of 
attempts to strengthen industry investment into fixed and mobile broadband deployment in the EU. 
It needs to be understood in conjunction with other measures, including the Cost Reduction Directive 
(2014) (which sought to lower the cost of deployment) and with the Recommendation on consistent 
non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the 
broadband investment environment (2013) (which sought to strengthen the incentives of network 
operators to deploy). 
The EECC includes a number of provisions that seek either to strengthen investment incentives or to 
reduce deployment costs for fixed or mobile network infrastructure. These include: 
• Article 74: Co-investment 
• Article 77: Wholesale-only undertakings 
• Article 53: Coordinated timing of assignments 
• Article 53a: Coordinated timing of assignments for specific 5G bands 
• Article 56: Deployment and operation of small-area wireless access points 
• Article 56a: Technical regulations on electromagnetic fields 
The first two of these are primarily relevant to fixed broadband networks, while the remaining four 
are primarily relevant to wireless networks and especially to wireless mobile networks. 
These EECC measures are likely to provide improvements, but they will not necessarily lead to an 
ideal level of network operator investment. It is likely that ex post assessment will reveal an ongoing 
need for further refinement of the EU’s broadband deployment strategy. 
Meanwhile, these measures operate solely on the supply side. Numerous studies have found that 
demand side stimulus can be more effective than supply side measures once basic broadband is 
sufficiently broadly available.42 Those studies suggest in effect that operating solely on the supply 
side is a bit like pushing on a rope – at some point, it is necessary to pull. 
It might well be, then, that the most productive steps for the next legislative term would represent a 
significant departure from the approach taken to date. Demand side approaches need not wait for 
experience with the EECC measures. 
42  J. Scott Marcus, Ilsa Godlovitch, Pieter Nooren, Dieter Eilxmann and Bram van den Ende with the support of Prof Jonathan Cave: 
„Entertainment x.0 to boost Broadband Deployment“, study on behalf of the European Parliament's Committee on Industry, Re sear ch 
and Energy (ITRE), October 2013 available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201310/20131017ATT72946/20131017ATT72946EN.pdf; J . Scot t  Mar cus, 
Francesco Caio and Gérard Pogorel (2014), "Achieving the Objectives of the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) in Italy: Prospects and 
Challenges", a study on behalf of Prime Minister Enrico Letta; • Parcu, P. L. et al. (2011), Study on Broadband Diffusion: Drivers 
and Policies. Study for the Independent Regulators Group, Florence School of Regulation; available at: 
http://www.irg.eu/streaming/CN%20%2811%29%2081_FSR_Study_on_BB_Promotion_FINAL.pdf?contentId=547201&field=ATTA CHE
D_FILE; Belloc, F., Nicita, A. and M. A. Rossi (2011), The Nature, Timing and Impact of Broadband Policies: a Panel Analysis of 30 OECD 
Countries, University of Siena. 
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5.2.3. Addressing barriers to cross-border shipment of goods in order to enable 
expansion of the Geo-Blocking Regulation 
The Geo-Blocking Regulation applies overall to goods sold online, but the crucial non-discrimination 
provisions of Article 4 do not apply to orders that would oblige the merchant to deliver goods, or to 
enable collection of goods, at a location in a Member State to which the merchant does not routinely 
offer delivery or collection. 
The exclusion is appropriate. The merchant would otherwise be obliged to be aware of and in 
compliance with rules in the country of use. 
One might not expect this to be the case. As Dahlberg (2015) observes, “The EU has, in addition, 
harmonised the regulation on a number of goods categories to ensure that national product 
regulation does not discriminate against foreign products. For products that have not been subject to 
harmonisation (for various reasons), the principle of mutual recognition states that a product that is 
lawfully marketed in one member state should have the right to be marketed in all member states.” 
There seems, however, to be a significant gulf between theory and practice. 
Merchants selling and shipping goods cross-border typically have to comply with a daunting variety 
of packaging and safety regulations at Member State level. Many Member States have strict 
requirements as regards packaging and labelling of food and of medication. Alcohol and tobacco 
products may also be subject to national restrictions. A range of safety obligations could also be 
relevant, ranging from toy safety to characteristics of gas pipelines. Since these relate in important 
ways to consumer safety, they cannot simply be ignored. Packaging and labelling requirements 
clearly impose additional costs on merchants who might otherwise hope to sell goods cross-border; 
moreover, Member States might in some cases be tempted to use these requirements to protect 
domestic industries.43 
For large e-merchants, these divergences are merely a costly nuisance. For SMEs, and especially for 
the smallest of SMEs, the associated transaction costs could represent a blocking problem (see 
Dahlberg (2015)). 
These challenges could potentially be addressed, but it would take a significant amount of hard work. 
A thorough analysis of practical impediments would need to be undertaken, justifiable national 
exceptions would need to be identified, and measures would need to be carefully crafted so as to 
make the principle of mutual recognition fully predictable and as close as possible to being fully 
applicable. 
There are many other impediments to cross-border sales of goods that require shipment, but most of 
these either have already been addressed, or could be addressed in other ways.  
The reform to VAT arrangements, for instance, including the Mini-One Stop Shop (MOSS), presumably 
addresses one set of problems. The pending legislative measures that seek to impose maximum 
harmonisation on horizontal consumer protection rules potentially address another. 
43  J. Scott Marcus and Georgios Petropoulos (2017), “Geo-Blocking of Goods That Require Cross-Border Delivery: A Preliminary View on EU 
Policy Considerations”, presented at the Rutgers/EUI FSR conference on postal economics in Barcelona, at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3007578_code333755.pdf?abstractid=3007578&mirid=1.
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Further reform of cross-border parcel delivery would also be beneficial (see Section 5.2.5), but is not a 
prerequisite to this reform. It seems clear that the e-merchant will need to be able to recover the extra 
cost of shipping goods cross-border if he or she is mandated to do so, but a fairly simple rule could 
suffice. For example, the merchant might have to ensure that the price charged to cross-border 
customers does not exceed the price charged to domestic customers by a sum greater than that by 
which the National Postal Operator’s published price for shipment of goods with the characteristics of 
the shipment in question (e.g. weight and volume) from the merchant’s Member State of 
establishment to the Member State to which shipment is requested exceeds the National Postal 
Operator’s published price for shipment of the same goods within the merchant’s Member State of 
establishment.44 
It is clear that a geo-blocking prohibition should not be imposed on e-merchants for goods that 
require shipment until all or nearly all of the attendant issues have been addressed, not only at EU 
legislative level but also in terms of practical transposition and enforcement at Member State level. 
5.2.4. Fundamentally re-thinking the European audiovisual sector in order to 
strengthen global competitiveness and cross-border consumption 
Services concerned primarily with the distribution of copyrighted audiovisual content are completely 
excluded from the Geo-blocking Regulation as enacted. Many consumers lament this omission, but i t 
was prudent in our view – the problems with cross-border distribution of audiovisual content are 
complex, and are not amenable to a quick fix solely through a prohibition on geo-blocking. (Marcus 
and Petropoulos, 2017) 
What is needed instead is a comprehensive re-thinking of the audiovisual sector so as to strengthen 
the ability and incentives of sector market players to actively market their high quality output 
throughout Europe and throughout the world (while still respecting the cultural and linguistic 
diversity that we cherish as Europeans). 
A key argument against a geo-blocking prohibition from the audiovisual sector has been that 
geographical segmentation is essential to the funding of their projects. Under current arrangements, 
this argument appears to be well founded. The producer of an audiovisual work is responsible for 
securing financing and can obtain it from various sources: in-house financing (cash investment from a 
single production company or pooling of resources of several production companies through co-
production mechanisms), pre-sales of distribution and communication to the public rights (contract 
which exchanges an upfront payment from a downstream player for an exploitation right from the 
producer, usually on an exclusive basis), debt financing (loan provided by a lender with a fixed 
repayment date), or private investments (cash investment from a private investor in exchange for a 
participation in the future film’s revenue). Figure 10 illustrates examples of the ways in which several  
films were financed in recent years. In the audiovisual sector, pre-sales through licencing and state 
subsidies are the most important sources of financing.  
44  J. Scott Marcus and Georgios Petropoulos (2017), “Geo-Blocking of Goods That Require Cross-Border Delivery: A Preliminary View on EU 
Policy Considerations”, presented at the Rutgers/EUI FSR conference on postal economics in Barcelona, at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3007578_code333755.pdf?abstractid=3007578&mirid=1.
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The pre-sales arrangements depend heavily on geographic restrictions, coupled with a complex 
system of release windows. Without a substantial reorientation of the sector, a geo-blocking 
prohibition would risk interfering with these pre-funding mechanisms, thus depressing production of 
content. 
Figure 10. Examples of sources of financing for independent films. 
Source: Oxera (2016) 
In a 2016 study prepared for firms in the sector, Oxera estimated that imposing a geoblocking 
regulation on audiovisual content would cause consumers to lose up to €9.3 billion per year, while 
producers would lose up to €8.2 billion per year. A 2014 study by CRA for the Commission arrived at 
similar conclusions. As things stand today, we believe that the concern is valid. 
A key concern here is that relatively little European audio-visual content is produced or distributed 
with international distribution in mind. In a typical year, non-national European films account for only 
12% of cinema admission market share. (By contrast, international distribution is a key part of 
Hollywood planning.) As a result, few European works get much circulation outside of their country 
(or language) of origin. 
Language is an issue, but it need not be decisive. Films can be dubbed, sub-titled, or voiced over. 
Hollywood faces the same issues with productions that are originally recorded in English. 
The European audio-visual sector has historically had a prodigious output, having produced 1,142 
feature films in 2008 compared to 520 in the USA. US films nonetheless consistently account for more 
than 60% of cinema admissions within the EU, twice as much as European films (see Table 7).  
US enterprises also account for the majority of fictional content on European television screens. This 
should clearly be viewed as a problem. 
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Table 7. European cinema admissions, by origin of film (2007 - 2012). 
Source:  European Commission (2013), Impact Assessment Report, communication on State Aid for Films and other 
Audiovisual Works 
These issues seem to be clear enough, but to the best of our knowledge they have never been 
studied in detail. Perhaps we have too great a tendency to take the structure of the sector for granted. 
The full dimensions of the problem do not appear to be well understood, and consequently the 
policy interventions that might be useful have never been put forward. Only with a deeper analysis 
would it be possible to assess whether options are available that are proportionate and not overly 
disruptive to the sector. 
If the global competitiveness of the European audiovisual sector were substantially greater, the 
dependence on pre-funding based on geographic partitioning at Member State level would be 
reduced. Once that were firmly in place, a prohibition on geo-blocking could be considered (or 
perhaps would become unnecessary because of the altered incentives of rights-holders). 
Whether this is feasible is not altogether clear today, but the challenge is fairly clear, and it is worth 
looking at. 
5.2.5. Further measures to address over-pricing of cross-border parcel delivery by 
National Postal Operators (NPOs) 
The growth of e-commerce represents a substantial growth opportunity for Europe. The ability of 
Europe to fully capitalise on this opportunity appears however to be limited by the high prices paid 
for the shipment of goods across national boundaries within the European Union. Concerns over the 
high cost of parcel delivery cross-border by National Postal Operators (NPOs) led to the Commission 
to put forward a legislative proposal in May 2016.45 
The concern has been with basic cross-border delivery services, not with express or courier services; 
with business-to-consumer (B2C) shipments rather than business-to-business (B2B); and primarily 
with shipments by consumers, micro-enterprises, and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) than 
rather than those by large shippers. The NPOs continue to play a major role in cross-border shipments 
for SMEs.46 
45  European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cross-border parcel deliver y 
services, COM(2016) 285 final.
46  J. Scott Marcus and Georgios Petropoulos (2017), “E-Commerce in Europe: Parcel Delivery Prices in a Digital Single Market”, in The 
Changing Postal and Delivery Sector: Towards a Renaissance, Springer, ed. Michael Crew, Pier Luigi Parcu, and Timothy Brennan. An earlier 
version appear as Bruegel Policy Contribution 2016/09, at http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/pc_2 01 6_ 09 .pdf, and a 
derivative work was presented at the ITS Europe conference in Cambridge, UK.
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Member State postal regulatory authorities were already obliged to ensure that retail prices were 
cost-based, presumably including cross-border prices, but implementation has historically been weak 
and uneven. In practice, many postal regulatory authorities had little statutory authority to collect 
even the most basic data, such as retail prices. Their role relative to cross-border parcel del ivery was 
often ambiguous, especially in cases where the NPO was not subject to a universal service obligation. 
Finally, given that NPOs tend to face challenges in maintaining their universal service obligations in 
the face of falling domestic letter traffic, the national postal regulatory authorities may be tempted to 
overlook possible over-pricing in one of the few areas where NPO revenues are exhibiting healthy 
growth. 
In economic terms, parcel delivery arrangements among the NPOs are complicated, and there is no 
external visibility at all into many aspects of the system (including the level of wholesale Terminal 
Dues and Inward Land Rates, and the degree of discounting provided to large shippers). That these 
commercially sensitive arrangements are not publicly visible is appropriate, but i t i s di fficult to see 
how national postal regulatory authorities could possibly assess the appropriateness of prices when 
they are missing key data about costs. 
The Commission’s legislative proposal sought (1) to increase the transparency of retail prices for 
consumers, (2) to increase the information gathering powers of national postal regulatory authorities 
to collect both wholesale and retail data, (3) to oblige postal regulatory authorities to assess cross-
border pricing, and (4) to open up the wholesale parcel delivery networks of the NPOs (which some 
allege to be priced substantially below cost) to competitive non-NPO parcel delivery services. The 
legislation as enacted weakened these measures considerably, and dropped the wholesale access 
obligation altogether. 
Our belief is that the Regulation as enacted will enhance transparency, but will have little or no effect 
on cross-border parcel delivery prices. Given the limited information gathering powers and the 
dearth of information available to the public and to postal regulatory authorities, it is likely to be 
some time before this is fully visible. In any case, a second round of legislation specifically aimed at 
the pricing issues is likely to merit consideration in the coming years. 
5.3. Promoting the digitisation of European business, government and 
society 
The remaining opportunities would be new initiatives, but many are foreshadowed by initiatives that 
are already under way. 
• dealing with emerging technologies including Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, big
data and the Internet of Things and harmonising their treatment where needed among the
Member States;
• addressing competition, taxation and content issues regarding digital services, including
platforms;
• reinvigorating interest in cross-border e-government services; and
• adopting a more vigorous approach at EU level to cybersecurity.
The need to address competition, taxation and content issues for platforms and other digital services 
is needed in order to complete the Digital Single Market, going beyond the DSM Strategy as 
proposed in 2015. Recall that the Commission defined a Digital Single Market as “one in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured and where individuals and 
businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities under conditions of fair competition, 
and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of 
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residence.” (European Commission, 2015a) When it comes to seamlessly accessing onl ine activities 
under conditions of fair competition, it is clear that there is more work to be done, and surely more 
than the suggestions offered in this study. 
The reinvigoration of efforts to enable cross-border e-government services likewise seeks to address a 
set of impediments to the Digital Single Market. Harmonisation tends to be challenging because the 
underlying delivery systems in the Member States are so diverse. (van Veenstra et al., 2013) 
5.3.1. Measures to promote and deal with a range of emerging technologies 
As noted in Section 2.2, the transformation of the EU through digitisation appears to depend on the 
adoption of a range of technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, big data, machine 
learning, the Internet of Things, and possibly blockchain. These technologies show tremendous 
promise, with some analysts projecting potential global benefits measured in trillions of euro per year 
(for a quantification of potential benefits, see Section 2.2). Many of these technologies have been 
known for decades, but price/performance is now reaching levels that favour large-scale deployment. 
Fast fixed broadband and mobile services (soon to include 5G) have become sufficiently widespread 
to make them fully accessible (see Section 5.2.2). 
Europe has aspirations not only to use these technologies, but also to design and develop them. 
Our focus here is on new legislative initiatives, not on business as usual. The Commission has for 
instance already been active in funding research, launching studies to consider policy issues, and 
where appropriate forming public private partnerships (PPPs) to facilitate dialogue between 
government and market players. 
At the same time, one can question whether the level of investment is adequate to maintain EU 
competitiveness in these potentially transformative technologies, and especially in AI. 
• China has launched a comprehensive initiative 47 to lead the world in AI development, and
intends to invest massively in AI research and development.48 The magnitude of the
investment is difficult to estimate, but is large.
• The United States, its historic scepticism about industrial policy notwithstanding, is deeply
concerned about the Chinese programme. The US had already been investing roughly one
billion Euro per year in 2016.49 Expanded countermeasures to the Chinese programme can be
expected, with the risk that Europe suffers “collateral damage”.
47  China (2017), A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (translated), at 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2017/07/20/a-next-generation-artificial-intelligence-development-plan/ viewed 
4 July 2018. 
48  Yujia He (2017), “How China is preparing for an AI-powered Future”,  Wilson Center, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/how_china_is_preparing_for_ai_powered_future.pdf viewed 4 July 2018. See also 
New America Foundation (2017), “China’s Plan to ‘Lead’ in AI: Purpose, Prospects, and Problems”, at 
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-plan-lead-ai-purpose-prospects-and-problems/ viewed 4 July 2018. 
49  European Commission (2018), “Artificial Intelligence for Europe”, op. cit. page 5. See also US National Science and Technology Council 
(2016), The National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan, at 
https://www.nitrd.gov/PUBS/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf viewed 4 July 2018.
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• According to the Commission’s Artificial Intelligence for Europe Communication, “Europe 
is behind in private investments in AI which totalled around EUR 2.4-3.2 billion in 2016,
compared with EUR 6.5-9.7 billion in Asia and EUR 12.1-18.6 billion in North America.”50 
Funding is crucial, but the bulk of funding for high tech start-ups and even more so for scale-ups 
(firms seeking to grow from start-ups into the next phase) ought to come from venture capital or 
from engaging in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), not from the public treasury at EU or Member State 
level. Unfortunately, a long-standing challenge in the EU has been excessive reliance on banks, and 
insufficient access of start-ups and especially of scale-ups to access venture capital. Other advanced 
economies such as the US and Japan do a better job. “EU firms are typically known for their 
overreliance on bank lending, especially for SMEs. In the period from 2002-2008, banking lending 
accounted for 70% of total financing in the euro area, compared to only 40% in the US”, as is visible in 
Figure 11. Over the full period from 2002 through Q1 of 2016, the disparity between the EU and the 
US was roughly 50% versus 25%. (European Commission, 2017f). 
Figure 11. Share of bank to non-bank financing of non-financial companies in the euro 
area and the US (cumulated transactions). 
Source: European Commission (2017f), based on ECB and US Federal Reserve System data. 
The Commission has been pursuing a Capital Markets Union (CMU) strategy to seeks (1) to improve 
access of entrepreneurs to venture capital, and (2) to modernise insolvency rules so as to give a 
second chance to honest entrepreneurs whose enterprises fail. Both of these were identified in a 
previous study for the Parliament, van Veenstra et al (2013), as being essential to the future success of 
EU start-ups and scale-ups.51 The CMU is important, but bringing it to fruition has been slow going. 52 
Re-doubled efforts are in order. 
50  European Commission (2018), “Artificial Intelligence for Europe”, op. cit. page 5. 
51   See also Jim Brunsden (2018), EU plan for capital markets union faces delay, warns Brussels, Financial Times. Commissioner 
Dombrovskis is quoted as saying, “If you look at reasons why many companies in Europe, capital markets companies, fintech 
companies, why they are not scaling up in Europe, it is exactly this fragmented regulatory and supervisory landscape wher e t hey ar e 
faced with different requirements in each member state. That’s the issue we need to address — this scaling up.” 
52   Ibid.
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Ensuring a sufficient pool of trained professionals for these emerging technologies (and retaining 
their services in Europe once they have been trained) represents yet another substantial challenge, 
but primary responsibility here appears to rest with the Member States. There is likely to nonetheless 
be a role for the European institutions in supporting and coordinating Member State policies, and in 
encouraging best practice. 
It is important not to prematurely regulate these innovative services, thereby stifling their 
development or distorting their evolution; at the same time, it seems likely that some issues will 
emerge that eventually require legislative solutions, and indeed some of these are already visible. 
The Parliament has been actively engaged in issues related to Artificial Intelligence and robotics, both 
with workshops (see for instance European Parliament, 2018) and with a 2017 resolution “with 
recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics”. The resolution addresses a 
wide range of issues, includes a Charter on Robotics with a Code of Conduct for Robotics Engineers, 
and calls on the Commission to submit “a proposal for a legislative instrument on legal questions 
related to the development and use of robotics and AI foreseeable in the next 10 to 15 years, 
combined with non-legislative instruments such as guidelines and codes of conduct”. (European 
Parliament, 2017a) 
One of the issues specifically flagged in the resolution is the issue of liability, and indeed, issues of 
product and service liability are emblematic of the areas where new legislation is likely to be needed. 
Two key groups of EU policy instruments are in place today: (1) product safety regulation, which 
establishes standards to which goods must conform; and (2) liability regulation, which enables 
consumers to recover their costs if they are harmed or injured due to a malfunctioning product (or 
potentially a defective service). Product liability is handled quite differently from service liability, with 
products subject to a strict liability regime at EU level (where the burden of proof on the consumer is 
minimised), but not services. (European Commission, 2018a) 
In recent work (Marcus, 2019), we suggested that further study was needed in several areas: 
• It is going to become increasingly difficult to draw a sharp line between products and services
for emerging IoT/AI/ML services. In the medium to long term, either a common liability
regime will have to be adopted for both, or else some crisp, new definitional criteria will need 
to be developed.
• Relative to the consumer, a strict liability regime seems to be the most appropriate way to
ensure compensation; otherwise, the burden of proof will be too great. For commercial
parties along complex IoT/AI/ML value chains, however, determining where the liability lies i s
likely to entail challenging, case-specific assessments. In particular, guidance is likely to be
needed where liability lies at least in part with conclusions autonomously reached by
algorithms.
• For consumers and suppliers, horizontal approaches that apply to all sectors are simpler and 
thus easier to deal with than sector-specific approaches. This property of EU liability
regulation (but not of EU safety regulation) should be retained going forward.
5.3.2. Competition, taxation, content and social protection issues regarding digital 
services 
Digital platforms such as Google, Facebook, and Uber, not to mention Apple and Amazon, have been 
repeatedly in the news in recent years as regards competitive concerns, fair treatment of taxation, 
and related state aid concerns. Content concerns as with “fake news” and its implications for the 
political process are also visible. 
The answers to the questions raised are not yet altogether clear, but they will surely continue to be 
part of the debate during the next legislative term. 
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In a number of instances, the emerging technologies noted in Section 5.3 are not only part of the 
problem, but potentially part of the solution. Consider competition policy, for example. Automated 
online pricing algorithms may spontaneously collude with one another, but automated tools based 
on AI, machine learning and big data techniques might prove effective in detecting collusion (and in 
distinguishing between permissible price convergence and impermissible collusion). These same 
technologies show promise in detecting inappropriate content, as well as “fake news”. 
Competition issues are sure to arise, but whether they require new legislative measures is not entirely 
clear. Existing competition law already provides a good arsenal of tools. Whether they are sufficient 
for the brave new world that we are entering remains to be seen.53 
In Section 5.1, we noted the importance of achieving a more integrated view across the ful l  range of 
policy tools, including industrial policy, regulatory policy, competition policy and trade policy. Similar 
ideas appear to already be taking root among many of the Member States. Nineteen of the Member 
States54 recently issued a joint statement announcing their intention to press the incoming 
Commission for a “new political impetus” to maintain the EU’s global competitiveness. Key elements 
include (1) the identification of European strategic value chains “prioritising those most directly 
linked to improving global productivity, fighting climate change, and enhancing technological 
development’, and (2) “the identification of possible evolutions of the antitrust rules to better take 
into account international markets and competition in merger analysis”. For each of the strategic 
value chains, a dedicated action plan would be developed, backed by EU funding and supported by 
policy instruments to include competition, innovation, digital, energy, trade, and taxation policy.55  
This is likely to require particular care in regard to competition policy. In a world where 
multilateralism and win-win approaches enjoy less support than in the recent past, it will be 
important to protect EU interests from encroachment by third countries who might be willing to use 
the policy instruments at hand indiscriminately. This is likely to require the EU to take a hard look at 
how we choose to use, or not to use, the policy levers available to us. Competition law is surely an 
important piece of this puzzle, but must be used with care. First and foremost, our approach should 
always be to promote the competitiveness of EU industry, not to target global competitors. Secondly 
and relatedly, if Europe were to be seen to be applying tools in a self-serving way, rather than 
objectively and fairly, it could undermine the integrity and creditability of the EU’s process, and 
thereby undermine global confidence in the liberal economic order. That would be counter-
productive – EU prosperity depends on global acceptance of a liberal economic order that is now 
under threat. 
Taxation of digital platforms is likely to be a contentious topic for the coming legislative term. It is 
clear that online platforms need to pay their fair share of taxes, and there is general agreement (in line 
with the OECD’s BEPS process) that taxation should occur where the service is used. Beyond that 
53  There are many examples. For a recent study for the Parliament that demonstrates the emerging challenges, but also makes clear the 
risks in premature or heavy-handed regulation, see Monti and Augenhofer (2018).
54  Jorge Valero (2018), 19 EU countries call for new antitrust rules to create ‘European champions’, EurActiv. The Member States are France, 
Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Spain.
55   Ibid.
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broad assertion, however, it will be hard to find consensus between the EU and our trading partners, 
and for that matter among the Member States of the EU itself. What constitutes “fairness”? 
A range of content related issues are also likely to be with us, some of which will need to be 
addressed at legislative level. Achieving fair compensation for rights-holders in the digital  world has 
been contentious, but may possibly be resolved by the still-contentious Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market 2016/0280(COD). Policing inappropriate content, and addressing “fake news”, 
appear to pose even more challenging problems. 
What constitutes “fake news” is to some extent debatable; moreover, there is the risk that an overly 
stringent regime, especially if implemented by a government body, might intentionally or 
unintentionally turn into a censorship regime. Suppressing “fake news” cannot be at the expense of 
freedom of expression. 
The Commission has engaged in a systematic programme to counter disinformation, including 
setting up an expert group, conducting a public consultation, and issuing a number of reports and 
communications. Most recently, the Commission announced an “Action Plan against Disinformation”, 
based on a range of voluntary measures. 
Whether this will prove to be sufficient remains to be seen. A recent study for the Parliament argues 
that a more muscular and comprehensive policy approach will eventually be needed. (Renda, 2018; 
see also Turk, 2018) 
More broadly, the combined impact of AI, machine learning, and big data on employment is 
potentially substantial. This implies significant societal dislocations that will need to be 
addressed. Furthermore, there are implications for social protection of workers as digitisation 
contributes to increasing labour flexibility – a trend with both positive and negative 
implications. With the shift away from traditional employment, and the increasing tendency for 
workers to combine traditional and non-traditional forms of work with self employment, how are 
workers to be protected? The European Pillar of Social Rights (European Union, 2018) provides a 
useful framework for discussion, and the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Recommendation on 
access to social protection for workers and the self-employed (European Commission, 2018j) 
represents a forward-looking approach to many of the challenges raised. Once again, this can be 
expected to be a recurrent theme during the next legislative term. 
5.3.3. Reinvigoration of emphasis on cross-border e-government service 
As we noted in previous work for the Parliament,56 Europe is not an intrinsically weak player as 
regards the implementation of ubiquitous e-government services. Indeed, the performance of front-
runner European Member States in terms of development and deployment of ubiquitous e-
governments ranks among the best in the world. What has conspicuously languished is the 
development of cross-border interoperable e-government services. 
56  Anne Fleur van Veenstra, J. Scott Marcus, Jonathan Cave, Noor Huijboom, Dieter Elixmann, Annette Hillebrand, Rebecca Schindler and 
Veronica Horvath (2013) “Ubiquitous Developments of the Digital Single Market”, study on behalf of the European Parliament's 
Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/507481/IPOL-IMCO_ET(2013)507481_EN.pdf. 
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We observed that the action lines in place individually and collectively did not appear to be having 
much effect on the problem. At the time, we identified opportunities in (1) Identification (e-ID), 
authentication, and authorisation schemes; (2) The European Interoperability Framework (EIF) and 
related activities; (3) eHealth, including exchange of patient data and ePharmacy; (4) e-VAT; and 
(5) e-Customs.
A review of progress made subsequently is well beyond the scope of the current study, but we 
anticipate that a great deal of work remains to be done. 
With that said, what should be done? Godel et al. (2018) make some modest proposals: “European 
initiatives can help by pioneering good practice, making ‘digital by design’ a reality throughout the 
European institutions, adhering to and promoting open standards; supporting research and 
development in relevant fields and supporting the creation and adoption of a e-trust/e-ID framework 
for the EU.” 
In its EU eGovernment Action Plan 2016-2020 (European Commission, 2016i), the Commission puts 
forward 20 concrete actions. (See also European Parliament, 2017b) Most of these are e-government 
initiatives that the Commission would undertake relative to its own services, which is in line with the 
recommendations of Godel et al. (2018). A few represent legislative proposals addressed to the 
Member States, and at least two of these have been enacted. The first of these relates to electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS services), an 
area that has been identified in numerous studies as being potentially a high payoff initiative. The 
other  seeks to establish a single window for reporting purposes in maritime transport and to 
digitalise transport e-documents – largely a fix to inefficiencies introduced through a 2010 Directive. 
It is safe to assume that there is far more work to be done in this area. 
5.3.4. Cybersecurity and trust 
Progress has been made in the current legislative term when it comes to strengthening the role of 
ENISA, and establishing a certification programme at EU level. 
Nonetheless, the level of investment at EU level is ludicrously small in comparison to the rate at which 
threats are growing, not only from commercial hackers but also from states and from state sponsored 
hackers. This risk is growing, particularly for some of the Member States in the east of the EU. A more 
muscular approach to cybersecurity at EU level appears to be needed. 
It has historically been difficult to achieve consensus at EU level, in part because larger Member States 
with well established cybersecurity programmes feared that EU capabilities might get in their way. At 
the same time, smaller Member States or those with less robust capabilities of their own would have 
welcomed an operational role for ENISA. (Marcus et al, 2012) The proposed Regulation on 
Cybersecurity is a step in the right direction, but only a small step. It is time to break this deadlock. 
The need for a cooperative, joined up approach to cybersecurity was highlighted in thoughtful 
remarks by Brad Smith, the CEO of Microsoft, to the RSA Conference in 2017: “We should start by 
acknowledging that no single step by itself will be sufficient to address this problem. … The time has 
arrived to call on the world’s governments to implement international rules to protect the civilian use 
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of the internet. … The time has come to call on the world’s governments to come together, affirm 
international cybersecurity norms that have emerged in recent years, adopt new and binding rules 
and get to work implementing them.”57 
Along these lines, the “Paris call for trust and security in cyberspace”58 issued under the sponsorship 
of French President Macron represents a welcome “call to arms”. In a succinct but wide-ranging 
statement, it invites it signatories to work together in order to “Prevent and recover from malicious 
cyber activities that threaten or cause significant, indiscriminate or systemic harm to individuals and 
critical infrastructure; … Develop ways to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and 
practices intended to cause harm; Strengthen the security of digital processes, products and services, 
throughout their lifecycle and supply chain; Support efforts to strengthen an advanced cyber hygiene 
for all actors; Promote the widespread acceptance and implementation of international norms of 
responsible behavior as well as confidence-building measures in cyberspace,” and more.  
The Paris Call represents an excellent statement of principles and objectives, but it wi l l  be effective  
only if it is backed by sufficient resources and implementation actions. 
5.4. Putting the candidate initiatives into perspective 
In order to provide a comparative perspective on the various candidate initiatives, it i s important to 
bear in mind that they differ from one another in many dimensions – not only in the magnitude of 
costs and benefits, but also in the degree to which the Union has competence to act. Some appear to 
us to be more politically fraught than others. 
In a few cases, we have identified complex issues where solutions probably cannot even be put 
forward until the problem has been studied in greater depth. In others, the problem is well 
understood but potential solutions would require careful assessment through the Better Regulation 
process. 
With this in mind, we have categorised the various initiatives put forward in this chapter along each 
of these dimensions in Table 8, and have clustered them into groups. The assessments reflect our 
subjective view of the benefits, costs, and difficulty of each of the candidate policy measure along 
each of the relevant dimensions. 
57 https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/ viewed 26 December 2018.
58 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018), Paris call for trust and security in cyberspace. 
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To summarise, the measures that we have put forward in this chapter and assessed in Table 8 are: 
• Public funding for AI and robotics. More public investment is needed in these potential ly
transformative technologies, and especially in AI and robotics, in order to maintain EU
competitiveness.
• Private funding for start-ups and scale-ups. The Capital Markets Union (CMU), which
included some measures in this direction, is stalled. EU start-ups and scale-ups continue to
suffer from a lack of venture capital, challenges in conducting IPOs, and problematic and
inconsistent insolvency regimes. A re-doubling of efforts is in order.
• Corporate taxation. Online platforms need to pay their fair share of taxes, and there is
general agreement (in line with the OECD’s BEPS process) that taxation should occur where
the service is used. 
Beyond that broad assertion, however, it will be hard to find consensus between the EU and 
our trading partners, and for that matter among the Member States of the EU itself.
• Training. Training and retaining skilled IT professionals in the EU is increasingly difficult. The
limited EU competence in this area poses a challenge.
• Employment and social protection. The combined impact of AI, machine learning, and big
data on employment is potentially substantial. This implies significant societal dislocations
that will need to be addressed. Furthermore, there are implications for social protection of
workers (including self-employed workers) as digitisation contributes to increasing labour
flexibility – a trend with both positive and negative implications. Again, the limited EU
competence in this area poses a challenge.
• E-government. Progress has been slow in the area of e-government. It is time to reinvigorate
EU efforts on cross-border e-government service.
• Network and information security. Progress has been made in the current legislative term
when it comes to strengthening the role of ENISA, and establishing a certification programme 
at EU level. Nonetheless, the level of investment at EU level is ludicrously small in comparison
to the rate at which threats are growing, not only from commercial hackers but also from
states and from state sponsored hackers. A more muscular approach to cybersecurity at EU
level appears to be needed.
• Cross-border sales of goods that require delivery. This would be a necessary prerequisi te
to expanding the Geo-Blocking Regulation to include goods that require cross-border
delivery. For this to be workable, it would be necessary to first address non-harmonised
requirements related to product safety, labelling and more. Existing legislation that mandates
mutual recognition of goods sold in another Member State would need to be made fully
effective in practice. 
• Re-think the structure of the EU audio-visual sector. This would be a necessary
prerequisite to expanding the Geo-Blocking Regulation to include services that primarily
deliver copyrighted audiovisual content. Expanding the Geo-Blocking Regulation without first
addressing structural problems in the audiovisual sector would risk undermining the funding 
model for the production of audiovisual content.
• Expand the scope of consumer protection. Inclusion of commercial guarantees, consumer
credit and gambling could generate welfare gains. Further extension could be considered to
fully cover financial services, passenger travel, healthcare and real estate.
• Further improve access regulation. Further work is likely to be needed to ful ly real ise  the
broadband investment that the EECC sought.
• Lower cross-border parcel delivery NPO prices. The Regulation as enacted does little to
bring prices down to levels reflective of costs. 
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Expanding the Regulation to mandate more competitive pricing, mainly on the part of 
National Postal Operators, would generate net gains, and would encourage a second round of 
enhancements. 
• Liability and new technologies. New legislation is likely to be needed to address issues of 
product and service liability where AI and machine learning come into play.
• Fake news and inappropriate content. Issues with inappropriate or misleading content are
growing. A more muscular and comprehensive policy approach is likely to eventually be
needed than the voluntary programmes currently in place to deal with “fake news”.
Automated tools based on AI, machine learning and big data techniques show promise in
detecting inappropriate content, and “fake news”.
• Detecting collusion. Automated platforms may have a tendency to collude, with or without
malicious intent, but automated tools may also prove crucial in detecting collusion.
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Table 8. A comparative perspective on possible initiatives to realise more of the potential of the Digital Single Market. 
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Action needed 
High payback areas where prompt action is feasible 
Public funding for AI and robotics H L Y M L Y Further increase funding 
Private funding for start-ups and scale-ups (CMU) H M Y H H N Political resolution needed 
Corporate taxation M L Y H H N Political resolution needed 
High payback areas where more study is needed to formulate plans 
Training and re-training H M N M H Y Study and funding needed 
Employment and social protection H H Y H H Y Many needs are understood 
E-government M H Y M H Y Study barriers, then push ahead 
Network and information security H H N M H Y More EU activism needed 
High payback areas where the way forward is not clear 
Cross-border  sales of goods that require delivery H H N H H N Study, better mutual recognition 
Re-think the structure of the EU audio-visual sector H H N H H N Comprehensive study 
Medium payback areas where more study is needed to formulate plans 
Expand scope of consumer protection M M N M M N Study of promising sectors 
Further improve access regulation M M N M M N Study 
Lower cross-border parcel delivery NPO prices M L Y H H Y Political resolution needed 
Areas where both study and research are needed 
Liability and new technologies L L N M M N Study 
Fake news and inappropriate content H* H N M M N Study  and technical progress 
Identifying collusion M M N L L Y Study and technical progress 
H=high, M=medium, L=low, Y=yes, N=no 
* - societal gains are not mainly economic
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ANNEX 
In this annex, we present a preliminary top-down estimation of the impact of elements of digital 
readiness, as expressed by the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), on GDP. We rely on a simple 
reduced-form model in which Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is regressed on DESI by a 
fixed-effect model using ordinary least squares (OLS). Reduced form regression is preferred because it 
is easy to understand and compare. The inclusion of several proxy variables in a single equation 
enables us to control for different factors at the same time. The objective is to estimate the historical  
contribution of improvements in the digital economy and society to national income, and to give a 
rough prediction of expected further gains if the trend continues.  
The Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) is a composite index that summarises indicators of digital  
performance of Member States in five dimensions: Connectivity, Human Capital, Use of Internet, 
Integration of Digital Technology, and Digital Public Services. The advantage of using DESI is i ts high 
level of aggregation that consistently groups various indicators into five, but its main disadvantage is 
its short history.59 Our analysis utilises the five main categories of DESI from 2014 to 2017 across 28 
Member States. The five categories are listed below: 
• Connectivity (DESI1) measures the deployment of broadband infrastructure and its quality. 
• Human Capital/Digital Skills (DESI2) measures the skills needed to take advantage of the
possibilities offered by the digital economy.
• Use of Internet Services by Citizens (DESI3) accounts for a variety of online activities, such as
consumption of online content,  online shopping and banking.
• Integration of Digital Technology by Businesses (DESI4) measures the digitisation of
businesses and e-commerce.
• Digital Public Services (DESI5) measures the digitisation of public services, focusing on
eGovernment and eHealth.
The regression seeks to explain (the natural logarithm of) GDP per capita using these five DESI 
indicators as explanatory variables in a fixed-effect regression of 112 observations.60 Only 
Connectivity can significantly explain per capita income, as detailed in column 1 of Table 9. 
If we discard Connectivity from the equation and re-estimate the coefficients of other indicators as 
shown in column 2, only the Digital Public Services indicator is significant at the 0.05 level. This 
second specification may be preferable because it explains more of the between-country variations in 
GDP per capita (i.e. provides for a greater R-squared).  
59 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/desi.  
60 GDP (chain linked volumes, index 2010=100) and population are based on Eurostat. 
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Table 9. Explaining GDP per capita by means of DESI indicators. 
Dependent Variable: ln GDP per 
capita 
(1) (2) 
Connectivity 1.8916*** 
(0.4039) 
Human Capital/Digital Skills -0.4867 1.9519* 
(1.0884) (1.0737) 
Use of Internet Services by 
Citizens 
0.2140 1.4742 
(0.9094) (0.9758) 
Integration of Digital 
Technology by Businesses 
0.4228 0.9772* 
(0.4877) (0.5314) 
Digital Public Services 0.4197 1.7783** 
(0.6963) (0.7110) 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Within R-Sq 0.7063 0.6248 
Between R-Sq 0.3078 0.4849 
Overall R-Sq 0.2314 0.4667 
No. of Country 28 28 
No. of Observations 112 112 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses.  
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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Numerous legislative measures have been initiated or enacted in support of the overall 
achievement of a Digital Single Market (DSM). This in-depth analysis provides a brief stock-taking 
of what has been achieved in economic terms, of what remains to be done, and of candidate 
initiatives for the next legislative term. 
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